Political defection, often described as party switching or cross-carpeting, has become an entrenched feature of Nigeria’s democratic practice since the return to civilian rule in 1999. While political migration exists in many multiparty democracies, its scale, frequency, and normalisation in Nigeria raise profound constitutional and moral concerns.
At its core, executive defection represents a violation of voters’ rights.
Citizens do not vote in a vacuum. They vote for individuals anchored to parties, manifestos, and ideological platforms. When an elected executive defects mid-tenure to another party, without a referendum, fresh mandate, or electoral consequence, it amounts to a political coup executed without tanks, but with legal silence.
What the Constitution Says – and What It Omits
Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution (as amended) clearly attempts to curb defections by legislators.
Sections 68(1)(g) and 109(1)(g) require lawmakers who defect from the party that sponsored their election to vacate their seats, except in cases of party division or merger. This reflects an intention to preserve party integrity and protect the electorate’s mandate.
However, this safeguard does not extend to executive office holders—the President, Vice President, Governors, and Deputy Governors. This omission has created a constitutional loophole that executives now exploit with impunity.
Between 2015 and 2025, several sitting governors defected while in office – including Aminu Tambuwal (Sokoto), David Umahi (Ebonyi), Bello Matawalle (Zamfara), Ben Ayade (Cross River), Sheriff Oborevwori (Delta), and Umo Bassey Eno (Akwa Ibom). In none of these cases was a fresh mandate sought or any legal sanction imposed.
The courts have consistently held that, in the absence of explicit constitutional provisions, they cannot impose penalties. In Attorney-General of the Federation v. Atiku Abubakar (2007), the Supreme Court ruled that executive defection does not constitute “gross misconduct” and cannot ground removal outside impeachment procedures. While legally sound, this decision exposed a dangerous democratic vacuum.
Executive Impunity and Democratic Erosion
The result is what scholars describe as “executive impunity” – a system where the highest elected officials can freely abandon the political platform on which they were elected, with no consequence to office, access to state resources, or authority.
This undermines:
Popular sovereignty
Party credibility
Electoral trust
Policy continuity
In weakly institutionalised party systems like Nigeria’s, defections are rarely ideological. They are often transactional, strategic, or self-preserving, further distancing governance from citizens’ choices.
Lessons from Comparable Democracies
Other democracies with similar political complexities have acted decisively.
India, through its Tenth Schedule (52nd Constitutional Amendment, 1985), disqualifies elected officials who defect from their sponsoring party. The Indian Supreme Court upheld this in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1993), affirming that party allegiance is integral to democratic choice.
South Africa, after experimenting with floor-crossing, reversed course in 2008 by constitutionally outlawing the practice due to its destabilising effects.
Nigeria is not alone. But Nigeria has delayed reform for too long.
The Way Forward: A Necessary Constitutional Amendment
If Nigeria truly seeks democratic consolidation ahead of 2027, executive defection must be constitutionally addressed, now.
Defections without consequences are civilian political coups. And history shows that all coups, whether military or political, ultimately weaken the state.
A reformed framework should:
1. Require any executive who defects mid-tenure to vacate office
2. Trigger a by-election, or allow the deputy from the original party to constitutionally continue – just as in cases of death or incapacity. Umaru Musa Yaradua was replaced by Goodluck Jonathan, and at state’s level were these following deputy governors who assumed the role of governors – thus, Lucky Aiyedatiwa replaced Akeredolu in Ondo, Mahmud Aliyu Shinkafi (deputy to Mamman Ali – Yobe) and Mukhtar Ramalan Yero replaced Patrick Ibrahim Yakowa – Kaduna, respectively, ensuring continuity of governance as per Nigeria’s democratic framework.
3. Immediately suspend access to state funds and executive authority upon defection
4. Empower INEC with clear constitutional backing to enforce these provisions
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Such reforms would:
Protect voters’ mandates
Strengthen political parties
Reduce opportunistic power shifts
Improve electoral stability
Restore public confidence in democracy
Defections
A Civic Gift Nigeria Deserves
Nigeria is the world’s largest Black nation and Africa’s leading democracy by scale. With that status comes responsibility.
A constitutional amendment regulating executive defections would be a fitting 2026 civic gift to Nigerians – one that affirms civilian rule, policy integrity, and democratic empowerment.
Democracy is not merely about winning elections.
It is about honouring the mandate given.
Contributors: NIDMECORP & European Journal of Law and Political Science
(Note:
NIDMECORP (NiD Mentoring Corp) is described as an international mentoring organisation and a “changed agent” for African nations, emphasising leadership development and capacity building. www.nidmecorp.com)
