”The best option is to discard the IMF/World Bank neoliberal policies he’s enamored with (which have never worked anywhere in the world) and embrace Awolowo’s welfarist capitalist template of governance that puts the development and wellbeing of people at the center of policies. That may restore his goodwill with the North—and even earn him more support elsewhere”
The mistake the government is making is to dismiss the protests as entirely politically motivated. They are not. Even if they wanted, Buhari and his associates couldn’t stop the protests both because the shelf life of Buhari’s “magic” has expired (his own house was besieged in Daura, and he had been pelted with stones while he was in power in cities like Kano and Maiduguri where he had been idolized) and because the extent of anguish people are going through now is unappeasable.
By Farooq Kperogi
The 10-day nationwide #EndBadGovernance protests that end today, known by the reduplicative compound “Zanga-Zanga” in Hausaphone northern Nigeria, have ruptured the coalition that President Bola Ahmed Tinubu managed to build with a portion of the northern Nigerian Muslim political establishment since 2014, which put Muhammadu Buhari in power in 2015 and 2019 and him in 2023.
But this Zanga-Zanga-inspired rupture also reveals the initial precarity and fragility of the strange-bedfellows coalition. Buhari and Tinubu were previously fierce political adversaries who distrusted each other’s motives and undermined each other.
Their alliance was more accurately a political scaffold that papered over their contradictions for a temporary gain, which was the ouster of Goodluck Jonathan from power.
Tinubu’s associates and acolytes in the Southwest, who said they protected Buhari from revolt in their region even when he bungled governance with uncommon ineptitude, are understandably miffed at the rawness, fierce intensity, and undiluted anti-Tinubu fervor of the protests in northern Nigeria.
They are wondering why Buhari, his associates, and even the APC establishment in the North didn’t return the favor. The answers are obvious, but people in power are often blind to the obvious, especially if the obvious is disquieting.
First, Buhari and his supporters know that the Tinubu group, which had a tight leash on the Southwest political space, didn’t protect Buhari from the consequences of his infernal incompetence out of any high-minded considerations. They did so because they needed power after Buhari’s term in office. It was unvarnished calculative opportunism.
Since Buhari’s people have no expectation of any kind of requital from Tinubu, like Tinubu did from them, they felt no obligation to protect or explain away Tinubu’s own hard-hearted incompetence. The chase often stops after a conquest. Men who woo women can relate to this sentiment.
Second, the misery that Tinubu’s simultaneous policies of never-before-seen astronomical petrol price increase and devaluation of the naira unleashed on the country are felt more deeply in the North than in any part of the country because of the preexisting multidimensional poverty in the region and the pervading insecurity that makes farming almost impossible.
Money is now both hard to find and worthless when it is found, and food is both hard to find and unaffordable when it is found. That is an unprecedentedly profound, not to mention unsurvivable, existential torment.
Two days after the #EndBadGovernance protests started, I told someone that many people in the North have been rendered so desolate, so destitute, and so despondent by the economic crunch that they are looking to cash in on the protests to commit suicide by police bullets because Islam forbids suicide.
Islam teaches that committing suicide guarantees an unfettered passage to the hottest depths of hellfire in the hereafter. I said many people who couldn’t survive the pain and humiliation of perpetual hunger might tempt security forces to shoot them so they could end it all and not fear that they would provoke the wrath of their Creator for committing suicide.
Of course, this is twisted thinking because a famous hadith, which every Muslim who took Islamic Studies in secondary school knows, says “Actions shall be judged according to intention.”
Well, my predictions turned out to be accurate. A friend shared a video of scores of protesters in a northern city chanting, “da yunwa ta kashe mu, da ma bullet ya kashe mu” (rough translation: “Instead of dying of hunger, we would rather be killed by a bullet”) as they confronted gun-wielding military and police officers.
There is also the viral video of protesters bursting into the Zamfara State Government House in Gusau and defying, even daring, menacing, gun-toting soldiers who tried to stop them. Several such scenes have been replicated throughout the North.
The mistake the government is making is to dismiss the protests as entirely politically motivated. They are not. Even if they wanted, Buhari and his associates couldn’t stop the protests both because the shelf life of Buhari’s “magic” has expired (his own house was besieged in Daura, and he had been pelted with stones while he was in power in cities like Kano and Maiduguri where he had been idolized) and because the extent of anguish people are going through now is unappeasable.
Apart from the usual criminals of opportunity (who exploit every unrest to steal and destroy), the vast majority of protesters think their only hope of living is to risk death and push back at policies that kill them slowly but surely. You can’t persuade people who have nothing to lose by dying.
That was why American author Dan Groat pointed out in his 2014 book titled In Monarchs and Mendicants, “Not interested in scarin’ anybody, but people with good sense are afraid of a man with nothin’ to lose.” Lance Conrad echoed this in his book The Price of Nobility when he said, “Only a fool would underestimate a man with nothing to lose.”
People who weren’t exempt from the rage of protesters can’t stop protesters from protesting.
The self-inflicted attenuation of Tinubu’s political capital in the North plays into the old debate in the Southwest about the best coalitional strategy to attain and retain power for the Yoruba.
The Chief Obafemi Awolowo strategy, which Afenifere still believes in, sees the Muslim North as a competitor and not an ally. The Awo strategy for getting power is to build an alliance between the entire South and Northern Christians.
But the Chief Ladoke Akintola template sees the Muslim North as a strategic partner in light of the deep historical and cultural ties that bind Yoruba people and several linguistic, ethnic, and cultural groups in the Muslim North, such as Borgu, Nupe, Igala, and Hausa people. (Read my October 9, 2021, column titled “Arewa and Oduduwa More Alike than Unlike.”) This is hardly surprising because even though Akintola was a Christian, he was from Ogbomoso whose traditional ruler traces ancestral roots to Borgu.
Chief MKO Abiola—and now President Tinubu—subscribe to the Akintola template. Abiola was briefly vindicated when he won the June 12, 1993, presidential election with enormous support from the North, including Kano, his opponent’s home state.
But the revocation of his epochal electoral triumph by a Northern military head of state—and the decidedly ethnic and regional character the fight for and the opposition to his mandate later took—appeared to justify the distrust of the Muslim North by the Awo group, which nonetheless gave full-throated support to Abiola to reclaim his mandate.
Tinubu, undeterred by Abiola’s experience, reinvented the Akintola template. It’s as if he wanted to prove that he could tread the same path and get to the destination that Abiola couldn’t get to. That must be why he called his presidential bid “Renewed Hope.” Abiola’s was “Hope.” Like Abiola, he chose a Muslim running mate. And, like Abiola, his running mate is a Kanuri man from Borno.
With the Muslim North now souring on him only one year into his first term and the unlikelihood of his ever recovering whatever goodwill he had from the region if he continues with his economic policies that push people to the brink of the existential precipice, the Awo/Afenifere group may be having the last laugh.
So, what should he do? The best option is to discard the IMF/World Bank neoliberal policies he’s enamored with (which have never worked anywhere in the world) and embrace Awolowo’s welfarist capitalist template of governance that puts the development and wellbeing of people at the center of policies. That may restore his goodwill with the North—and even earn him more support elsewhere.
The other options are non-starters, but I’ll mention them anyway. Like Chief Olusegun Obasanjo who won his first term with the support of the Muslim North, but who later used the Awo/Afenifere template to get a second term, Tinubu can court the Christian North and galvanize the South. Goodluck Jonathan used this template in 2011 and won.
The problem is that if Peter Obi runs in 2027, and I don’t see any reason why he won’t, Tinubu won’t be able to galvanize the South into a unified voting bloc. And, although the worst fears of his Muslim-Muslim ticket among Christians haven’t materialized, northern Christians are unlikely to embrace him wholeheartedly, however hard he tries to woo them.
In other words, Tinubu is cooked, as Gen Zs say. Anything short of bringing down the cost of petrol, restoring the value of the naira, and making everyday things affordable will doom Tinubu’s first term and deny him a second term because he is now effectively a political orphan.
(Farooq Kperogi is a renowned Nigerian columnist and United States-based Professor of Media Studies. )
