Tag: Law

  • INTEGRITY TESTS”, JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS, AND THE PERILS OF OVERREACH

    INTEGRITY TESTS”, JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS, AND THE PERILS OF OVERREACH

     

    By Sylvester Udemezue

    Following a news report that *“34 Lawyers Fail NJC Integrity Test for Appointment as Judges,”* and the intense debate it provoked within the legal community, a very senior lawyer and former Attorney-General of a Nigerian state suggested that “any person who fails the integrity test is not qualified to be a lawyer, ab initio.” That assertion raises serious questions which deserve careful, sober, and dispassionate interrogation.
    With the utmost respect, that conclusion cannot be accepted without qualification. Its validity depends heavily on context, process, and the standards applied.

    *INTEGRITY: ESSENTIAL, YES, BUT HOW DETERMINED?*

    There is no dispute that integrity is indispensable to the legal profession. It is foundational both for those who practise law and for those who sit in judgment. However, integrity (particularly as assessed in the context of judicial appointments) often rests substantially on the opinions and perceptions of assessors. In such circumstances, integrity becomes a subjective determination, shaped by institutional priorities, human discretion, and sometimes opaque considerations. That reality demands caution before sweeping consequences are attached to the outcome of such assessments. Before it can be validly asserted that a person has failed an integrity test to the extent of being disqualified from legal practice, the process must, at the very least, be public, transparent, anchored on the reasonable-person standard, rather than the subjective preferences of a select body whose mandate is to choose candidates for judicial office.
    Most importantly, any such integrity test must be applied uniformly to all practicing lawyers (whether applying for judicial appointment or not) and serving judges. It is neither fair nor equitable to disqualify lawyers whose alleged integrity deficiencies surfaced only because they applied for judicial office, while sparing others who may equally lack integrity but have simply not sought appointment.

    *JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT INTEGRITY TESTS ARE NOT UNIVERSAL VERDICTS*

    A lawyer may fail the integrity screening of the National Judicial Council for purposes of appointment as a Federal High Court judge and yet remain a person of transparent personal and professional integrity.
    Failure of such a test, without more, should not automatically translate into a universal and permanent finding that the individual lacks integrity for all purposes, particularly for continued legal practice. Judicial appointment standards are context-specific, not existential verdicts on professional worth.

    *A NECESSARY QUESTION: WHAT OF SERVING JUDGES?*

    This discussion inevitably raises a further and more troubling concern: when will integrity testing be extended to serving judges? If integrity assessments are to carry such far-reaching consequences, fairness demands consistency. Consider, for example:

    (a). Would a judicial officer who allows political or executive influence to shape decisions pass an integrity test?

    (b). What of judges who habitually issue conflicting orders or abuse ex parte powers?

    (c). Would a judge who permits matters to stagnate in court for five to ten years meet any reasonable integrity benchmark?

    Unfortunately, these examples are not hypothetical. The list is long, and well known.

    *THE DANGER OF SWEEPING CONCLUSIONS*

    Before one can validly declare that “any person who fails an integrity test is not qualified to be a lawyer,” it is essential to interrogate the yardsticks applied, and the motivations underlying the findings of the appointing body; and the objectivity, transparency, and public verifiability of the process, particularly within our national context. Absent such interrogation, sweeping conclusions risk collapsing due process into institutional fiat.

    *AN ANALOGY FROM COMPANY LAW*

    The danger of overreach is well illustrated by company law. Section 330(2) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), 2020 (Nigeria) provides that the secretary of a private company need not be professionally qualified; the board may appoint anyone it considers capable. If the board of ABCD Nigeria Limited rejects Mr. Jim’s application on the ground that it does not consider him capable, does that rejection objectively establish (ab initio) that Mr. Jim lacks capacity? Clearly not. He may well be appointed by XYZ Nigeria Limited, whose board forms a different assessment. The decision reflects institutional judgment, not an absolute truth.

    *SUBJECTIVITY, FAIRNESS, AND DUE PROCESS*

    Beauty, as they say, lies in the eye of the beholder. Integrity assessments are no different. Numerous variables (some legitimate, others less so) may influence such determinations. If integrity assessments are to be relied upon to disqualify lawyers from practice, then fairness demands an independent, transparent process guided by clear, objective, and publicly verifiable standards.
    By analogy, would anyone seriously contend that the Legal Practitioners Privileges Committee’s failure to appoint a lawyer as a Senior Advocate of Nigeria automatically means that the lawyer is unqualified, undeserving, or professionally deficient? Of course not. The Proper Course
    In my respectful view, the appropriate path forward is clear:

    (1). If lawyers are to be disqualified from legal practice on the basis of a judicial-appointment integrity test, they must first be subjected to a confirmatory assessment: public, transparent, and grounded in the reasonable-person standard.

    (2). Any such integrity assessment, if it is to exist at all, must apply uniformly to all lawyers and judges, not selectively to only some. What’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. Equality is equity.

    (3). Most consistent with due process (and this is my most preferred recommendation), any person who believes that any lawyer or judge lacks the integrity required for legal practice or judicial service should invoke the established disciplinary mechanism by petitioning the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee, where allegations can be tested according to law and fair procedure.

    *Final Words*

    Integrity is indispensable to the legal profession. On that, there is no disagreement. But we must be careful not to sacrifice objectivity, transparency, and due process on the altar of subjective assessments, however well-intentioned they may appear. The rule of law demands nothing less.

    (Respectfullly,
    Sylvester Udemezue (Udems)
    Proctor, The Reality Ministry of Truth Law and Justice (TRM).
    08021365545.
    udems@therealityministry.ngo.
    (01 January 2026))

  • Ex Parte Order For Bail Is Not “Bizarre” And Courts Do Not Lose Power Because Outcomes Are Unpopular: A Respectful Surrejoinder To O.F. Akeredolu, PhD

    Ex Parte Order For Bail Is Not “Bizarre” And Courts Do Not Lose Power Because Outcomes Are Unpopular: A Respectful Surrejoinder To O.F. Akeredolu, PhD

     

     

    By Sylvester Udemezue

    I read a piece titled, “A Rejoinder To Sylvester Udemezue’s Piece On EFCC Lead Counsel’s Public Statement On Ex Parte Bail Order For Ex-AGF Malami” written by a respected learned friend, O.F. Akeredolu, PhD. I am sincerely grateful to Dr. Akeredolu for the rejoinder and for engaging my article with seriousness. That engagement itself affirms the value promised in my concluding note: correction by reasoned submissions grounded in law. However, with due respect to my dear learned friend, his rejoinder proceeds on a fundamental misapprehension of the scope, target, and gravamen of my original intervention. This surrejoinder is therefore necessary (not to prolong controversy) but to restore analytical precision.

    *WHAT MY ARTICLE DID NOT ADDRESS*

    At the outset, it is important to restate what my article did not purport to do. I did not:

    (1). Adjudge whether the EFCC acted lawfully overall;

    (2). Determine whether Malami should or should not be granted bail;

    (3). Pronounce on whether service of the ex parte order was properly effected; or

    (4). Assert that the EFCC was already in contempt of court.

    Those questions , particularly service, may be procedurally relevant in practice, but they were not the subject of my article.

    *THE NARROW ISSUES MY ARTICLE ADDRESSED (AND ONLY THESE)*

    My published opinion interrogated only three discrete legal points, and no more, namely:

    (1). The blanket assertion attributed to EFCC Lead Counsel that it is “most bizarre” for a court to grant bail ex parte;

    (2). The propriety of resorting to social media to challenge or delegitimise a court order, rather than invoking judicial remedies; and

    (3). The description of an unarraigned suspect as a “criminal defendant.”

    Dr. Akeredolu’s rejoinder largely sidesteps these points and reframes the debate around service and context, thereby answering questions I did not pose, while leaving the core propositions unaddressed.

    *ON THE ARGUMENT BY DR. AKEREDOLU REGARDING “SERVICE” OF THE EX PARTE ORDER*

    The emphasis placed on service of the ex parte order, while procedurally relevant, does not answer the question I raised. My critique was not that the EFCC should have complied with an order it had not been served with; rather, it was that it is legally incorrect to assert that courts lack the power to grant bail ex parte, or that such an act is inherently “bizarre.” Whether or not service was effected does not transform a legally authorised judicial act into a legal impossibility. A court either has the jurisdiction and procedural authority to make an order, or it does not. Service affects enforceability, not legality.

    *ON THE FREP RULES AND EX PARTE BAIL*

    Dr. Akeredolu suggests that reliance on the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009 (FREP Rules) is misplaced because the matter was not framed as a fundamental-rights action. With respect, this conflates two separate inquiries:

    (1). Whether the application before the court was in fact brought under FREP; and

    (2). Whether Nigerian law recognises the power of courts to grant bail ex parte under FREP.

    My article/opinion addressed only the latter. Order IV Rules 3 and 4 of the FREP Rules expressly empower courts, in appropriate circumstances, to grant interim reliefs, including bail, ex parte where the life or liberty of the application is threatened. For the avoidance of doubts, Order IV Rule 3 provides: “The Court may, if satisfied that exceptional hardship may be caused to the Applicant before the service of the application especially when the life or liberty of the applicant is involved, hear the applicant ex parte upon such interim reliefs as the justice of the application may demand”. That proposition is doctrinally unassailable. Whether FREP was properly invoked in Malami’s case is a merit question, to be tested before the court, not a basis for declaring ex parte bail “bizarre.”

    *ON “EXCEPTIONAL HARDSHIP” AND JUDICIAL DISCRETION*

    I did not argue that exceptional hardship automatically translates into ex parte bail, nor that bail is the only possible relief. Courts retain discretion to fashion appropriate interim remedies. Order IV Rule 4(c)(i) to (v) expressly sets out the various orders or reliefs the court may grant in the circumstances:

    “Where the application is made ex parte for interim reliefs, the Court may make the following orders:

    (i) Grant bail or order release of the Applicant forthwith from detention pending the determination of the application;

    (ii) Order that the Respondent against whom the order for the release of the applicant is sought be put on notice and abridge the time for hearing the application;

    (iii) Order the production of the Applicant on the date the matter is fixed for hearing if the Applicant alleges wrongful or unlawful detention.

    (iv) Grant Injunction restraining the Respondent from taking further steps in connection with the matter or maintaining status quo or staying all
    actions pending the determination of the application;

    (v) Any other order as the Court may deem fit to make as the justice of the case may demand”.

    Discretion presupposes jurisdiction. And the existence of alternative remedies does not negate the court’s power to grant bail ex parte where justice so demands. To suggest otherwise is to collapse discretion into prohibition.

    *ON THE TERM “CRIMINAL DEFENDANT”*

    The rejoinder by Dr Akeredolu downplays the mischaracterisation of Malami as a “criminal defendant” as mere descriptive imprecision. With respect, that understates the issue. Under Nigerian criminal procedure, the distinction between a suspect and a defendant is not rhetorical; it is juridical. A person becomes a defendant only upon arraignment. This distinction engages constitutional protections, including the presumption of innocence under section 36(5) of the Constitution.Terminology matters in law, particularly when used by senior counsel speaking publicly on an ongoing matter. Precision is not pedantry; it is fidelity to legal status.

    *ON THE PROPER RESPONSE TO AN EX PARTE ORDER*

    Even assuming one is dissatisfied with an ex parte order, Nigerian law is settled on the remedy: apply to discharge, vary, or set it aside, or appeal. What the law does not contemplate is a public denunciation of the court’s competence to have made the order at all. That distinction lies at the heart of my critique and remains unanswered in the rejoinder.

    Further, and contrary to Dr Akeredolu’s representation, my article was not an attack on the EFCC, nor a defence of Malami. It was a defence of an accurate statement of law, procedural discipline, and constitutional restraint. To insist that courts possess only those powers we are comfortable with in moments of public anger is to weaken, not strengthen, the rule of law.

    Finally, I agree that the debate would indeed benefit from recalibration, but recalibration begins with engaging the actual propositions advanced, not substituting them with adjacent procedural concerns. Until it is shown that Nigerian law renders ex parte bail legally aberrant, or that courts lack authority to grant it in appropriate circumstances, the assertion that such orders are “bizarre” remains unsustainable.

    I remain, as stated, open to correction: by law, by authority, and by reasoned argument.

    Respectfully,
    Sylvester Udemezue (Udems).
    08021365545.
    udemsbackup@gmail.com.
    (27 December 2025)

  • A Rejoinder To Sylvester Udemezue’s Piece On EFCC Lead Counsel’s Public Statement On Ex Parte Bail Order For Ex-AGF Malami

    A Rejoinder To Sylvester Udemezue’s Piece On EFCC Lead Counsel’s Public Statement On Ex Parte Bail Order For Ex-AGF Malami

     

     

    By O. F. Akeredolu, PhD

    Dear sir, I am writing this because I believe you are ‘open, always to being corrected by reasoned submissions grounded in law’.

    I have read with care the article titled “EFCC Lead Counsel’s Press Release, Ex Parte Bail Order for Ex-AGF Malami, and the Perils of Terminological Mischaracterisation.” While the piece raises issues worthy of legal reflection, it unfortunately proceeds on a distortion of both facts and context, and in doing so misdirects the legal inquiry.
    This rejoinder seeks to restore focus to the real issues, clarify the applicable legal framework, and place the comments attributed to the EFCC Lead Counsel in their proper procedural and jurisprudential setting.
    1. The Central Issue Is Service, Not Abstract Possibility
    The foundational question is not whether, in the abstract, a court can grant bail ex parte under Nigerian law. The real and decisive question is:
    Was the EFCC served with any court order granting bail to Mr. Abubakar Malami, SAN?
    If no such order was served, then the EFCC remained legally bound by the subsisting remand order of the same court, which was made on a motion on notice. In that circumstance, continued detention pursuant to that remand order cannot, in law or logic, be characterised as defiance of the court or a violation of rights.
    Once this procedural reality is appreciated, much of the outrage and commentary dissolves.
    2. The EFCC Lead Counsel Was Quoted Without Context
    The statement attributed to the EFCC Lead Counsel—that it would be “most bizarre” for a judicial officer to grant bail ex parte to a criminal defendant without putting the detaining authority on notice—must be understood contextually, not rhetorically.
    The statement was made against the background of non-service of any such order and the existence of a valid remand order. Viewed in that light, the comment was neither reckless nor contemptuous of judicial authority. Rather, it was an expression of a legitimate procedural concern rooted in settled practice:
    that a detaining authority cannot be faulted for acting on an existing court order in the absence of a contrary one brought to its notice.
    3. On the Invocation of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules
    The reliance placed on the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules (FREP) in the article is, with respect, misplaced.
    FREP is a special, specific, and sui generis procedural framework, activated only where a fundamental rights action is properly before the court. It is not a universal template to be invoked in every detention scenario, nor does it automatically override subsisting criminal process orders.
    This matter, as publicly presented, was not framed as a fundamental rights enforcement action. It arose within the context of criminal investigation and remand proceedings. To import FREP wholesale into that context, without more, is to confuse exceptional procedure with general criminal process.
    Law must be applied with precision. A tool designed for one purpose cannot be indiscriminately deployed for another.
    4. Exceptional Hardship Does Not Automatically Translate to Ex Parte Bail
    Even where “exceptional hardship” is alleged—medical needs being the usual example—it does not follow, as a matter of course, that ex parte bail is the inevitable or appropriate remedy.
    Courts possess a spectrum of remedial options:
    medical access, hospitalisation under guard, or tailored directives to the detaining authority. Bail, particularly ex parte bail, is only one option and not always the most proportionate.
    In a matter of this sensitivity and public importance, the more cautious and balanced approach would ordinarily be to ensure adequate medical care while maintaining the integrity of the judicial process.
    5. On Terminology: Precision Must Not Obscure Substance
    Considerable emphasis was placed on the use of the phrase “criminal defendant,” with the argument that a person becomes a defendant only upon arraignment.
    While terminological precision is important, it must not be elevated to the point where it obscures substantive justice. In public legal communication, such expressions are often used descriptively, not as technical pronouncements on procedural status. An arguable imprecision in language does not invalidate the substance of the concern being expressed.
    The law is not served by replacing substantive analysis with semantic absolutism.
    6. Exceptional Procedures Must Remain Exceptional
    It is trite that there are circumstances where normal criminal procedure may be departed from—just as there are rare cases where proceedings may continue in the absence of a defendant, or urgent orders may be made ex parte. But these remain exceptions, not norms.
    The mere existence of an exception does not justify its routine invocation, nor does it warrant public censure of law enforcement officials acting within the bounds of existing court orders.
    Conclusion
    The debate surrounding this matter would benefit from a recalibration. The real issue is not whether courts possess certain powers in theory, but whether, in the concrete circumstances presented, those powers were properly invoked, communicated, and acted upon.
    Until it is shown that a valid court order granting bail was duly made and served, criticism of the EFCC for acting on a subsisting remand order is premature. Equally, caution must be exercised against stretching specialised procedural frameworks beyond their intended scope.
    The administration of criminal justice thrives not on sensationalism or abstract theorising, but on context, restraint, and procedural fidelity. It is only by keeping these principles in view that public discourse can meaningfully contribute to, rather than complicate, the rule of law.

    I will appreciate it sir, if you can cause this to be published and circulated just as the main story.

    O. F. Akeredolu (PhD)
    Diamond Alternative Legal Services, C/O, Kunle Ijalana & Co. No 19, Akure/Owo Road, Opposite Pinnacle Filling Station, Fiwasaye Girls Grammer School, Akure, Ondo State.

  • The Law anchors political stability, guarantees economic confidence–CJN

    The Law anchors political stability, guarantees economic confidence–CJN

     

    The Chief Justice of Nigeria (CJN), Justice Kudirat Kekere-Ekun, says the law is the anchor of political stability, the guarantor of economic confidence and the framework within which freedoms are exercised and responsibilities
    enforced.

    Kekere-Ekun stated this on Tuesday at the Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies (NIALS) Fellows’ Lecture and 19th Conferment of Institute’s Honorary Fellowship in Abuja.

    The News Agency of Nigeria (NAN) reports that the Lecture was titled: “Law, Politics and Economic Development; Nigeria at Cross Roads.”

    (From.Left: Mr Tijjani Gazali, SAN, acting Director of Civil Appeals, Federal Ministry of Justice who represented Minister of Justice, Mr Lateef Fagbemi, SAN; the Chief Justice of the Federation, Justice Kudirat Kekere-Ekun; and the Director-General (DG) of Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies (NIALS), Prof. Abdulqadir Abikan, on Tuesday at the Institute’s Fellows’ Lecture and 19th Conferment of Institute’s Honorary Fellowship in Abuja.)

     

    The CJN said the law is not an abstract ideal confined to courtrooms or classrooms.

    “At a moment when our nation confronts complex socioeconomic pressures and shifting political expectations, the primacy of the rule of law becomes even more evident.

    “For the judiciary, this reality carries a solemn charge.

    “Our constitutional mandate demands fidelity to the law, impartiality in its application, and courage in its defence.

    She said public trust, which is the lifeblood of justice, must be earned every day through transparent processes, reasoned decisions and an unwavering commitment to fairness.

    “The courts do not operate in
    isolation from society; rather, they operate at its moral and institutional
    core.

    “It is therefore essential that our deliberations today contribute to
    strengthening that core.

    “This is precisely why the Fellows’ Lecture remains such a vital institution
    within NIALS,” she said.

    The CJN, who is also a Fellow of the institute, commended the leadership of NIALS for preserving the tradition and for continuing to elevate the quality of public discourse in the country.

    The Guest Lecturer, Mr George Etomi, said his paper established a conceptual framework that defines Nigeria’s efficacy through the critical correlation of law, politics and economic development.

    “It argues that a functional, predictable legal framework is the indispensable ‘Architect of Society,’ necessary to constrain political power and create the certainty required for sustainable economic growth,” he said.

    According to Etomi, by analysing Nigeria’s trajectory, this study demonstrates that the nation’s systemic governance crisis is rooted not in the absence of policy or law, but in widespread, institutionalised non-compliance with its own legal instruments.

    “This non-compliance manifests as weak enforcement of contracts, arbitrary regulatory application and compromised accountability, leading to reduced government revenue, deterred Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs), and eroded public trust in the judiciary.”

    He said to achieve a future of diversified, inclusive economic progress, this would depend entirely on enforcing the laws that already exist, thereby restoring legal predictability and political legitimacy.

    The Director-General (DG) of NIALS, Prof. Abdulqadir Abikan, in his welcome remark, said this year’s title was not just merely an academic topic but the central dilemma of the nation’s national project.

    “It demands that we confront the intricate, often contentious, nexus where legal frameworks intersect with political will and economic aspirations.

    “At this crossroads, the choices we make—or fail to make—will define our trajectory for generations.

    “We have assembled today to listen, learn, and engage with a rigorous examination of this critical triad.

    We expect nothing less than a lecture that will illuminate the path forward with scholarly insight and courageous clarity,” he said.

    The DG said the dual agenda of the occasion speaks directly to the core of the NIALS institutional mission.

    NAN reports that Chief Kanu Agabi, SAN; Muhammed Adoke, SAN; Mallam Yusuf Alli, SAN, and Prof. Muhammed Ladan were conferred with Honorary Institute Fellowship 2025.

  • A Nigerian Judge and His À La Carte Law

    A Nigerian Judge and His À La Carte Law

     

     

    By Chidi Anselm Odinkalu

    One month after President Bola Ahmed Tinubu proclaimed a state of emergency over Rivers State last March, on 18th April 2025, Barr. Nyesom Wike, former Rivers State Governor, now Minister of the Federal Capital Territory, and Life Member of the Body of Benchers, held one of his beverage-powered media encounters in Abuja. He proclaimed with characteristic exuberance that his successor as Governor, Siminalayi Fubara, “should thank Mr President” for the emergency proclamation.

    On 22nd October 2025, this line officially made it into Nigerian jurisprudence when James Omotosho, a judge of the Federal High Court of Nigeria, decided in Suit No. FHC/PH/CS/53/2025, that the plaintiff “should be grateful” that the president proclaimed the emergency over Rivers State. The messenger through whom these words have now officially become law in Nigeria offers important insights into what has become the fate of judicial office in the country.

    When he terminated the emergency rule in Rivers State in September 2025, President Tinubu took time to acknowledge “over 40 cases in the courts in Abuja, Port Harcourt, and Yenagoa” filed to challenge the declaration, noting with a touch of presidential menace that “some cases are still pending in the courts as of today.” On the 22nd of April, James Omotosho decided one of those pending cases.

    The plaintiff in the case was Samuel Amatonjie, who described himself as a resident and registered voter in Rivers State, and a member of the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA). That means he is also a lawyer. The six defendants in the case included the President of Nigeria, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Attorney-General of the Federation, the National Assembly, and the Military Administrator of the Emergency.

    Although he filed the case at the Port Harcourt Division of the Federal High Court, Mr Amatonjie’s case inexplicably travelled to Abuja, where it inexorably ended up in the court of James Omotosho, a judge whose fixation with all matters in which Nyesom Wike has even the most tangential of interests has become plainly pathological. Some context is essential here.

    In October 2023, a mere five months after the end of Mr Wike’s tenure as governor of Rivers State, the State House of Assembly, the site of an early attempt to remove the governor, suffered a conveniently timed fire incident. It became evident that the relationship between Mr Wike and Siminalayi Fubara, his hand-picked successor, was hopelessly fractured. In the wake of that, the state legislature splintered into two factions, respectively loyal to the incumbent governor and his predecessor.

    On 6th November 2023, the faction loyal to the governor headed to the Federal High Court in Port Harcourt, the State capital, seeking judicial legitimation of its claims to being in lawful control of the parliamentary gavel. They applied in proceedings intended to be heard without the other parties present (ex-parte) for an order to restrain the other faction from interfering with their conduct of legislative duties. Delivering her ruling the following day in Suit No. FHC/PH/CS/240/2023, Phoebe Ayua, the presiding judge, declined this application; required that all sides be put on notice for a full hearing; and ordered that the parties “should not take any step concerning the subject matter, since the matter is already before this court.”

    Three weeks later, on 29th November 2023, while this order remained undischarged, Martin Amaewhule, the Speaker of the faction in the State House of Assembly loyal to Mr Wike and, himself, a named defendant in the proceedings before Justice Phoebe Ayua, filed Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/1613/2023 before the same Federal High Court in Abuja on the same subject matter. Like the previous suit, Amaewhule sought judicial legitimation of a factional claim to control of the Rivers State legislature, asking the court to restrain federal authorities and institutions as well as the Governor of Rivers State from exerting financial or other pressures on them and ensuring release to them of all federal allocations standing to the credit of the Rivers State House of Assembly.

    As with the previous suit in Port Harcourt, the plaintiffs in the case before the Federal High Court invited the judge in Abuja to grant them these reliefs without hearing the named defendants. The following day, on 30th November, James Omotosho, the judge who presided over the proceedings in Abuja, ruled swiftly and, unlike his colleague in the Port Harcourt case, promptly granted all the reliefs sought without hearing any other person.

    This was not the first time that James Omotosho would portray himself as a fully subscribed, judicial Man Friday, granting curious orders deeply solicitous of the political interests of Mr Wike. In the month originally preceding the governorship election in 2019, he issued an order restraining the All Progressives Congress (APC), the main opposition party in Rivers State, from presenting any candidate in the governorship election, all but ensuring that the governorship election in the State was Mr Wike’s electoral non-event.

    In February 2023, James Omotosho again issued another order restraining the Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP), who were not afforded a hearing, from taking disciplinary measures against Mr Wike on allegations of anti-party activities.

    In January 2024, James Omotosho voided the Appropriations of Rivers State and issued a most remarkable of à la carte judicial orders, restraining the State Governor from “frustrating” the Amaewhule faction of the House of Assembly loyal to Mr Wike.

    On the last day of October 2025, the same judge struck again in proceedings filed by Mr. Wike’s loyalists, granting them an à la carte order to invalidate the proposed National Convention of the PDP by restraining the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) from attending or recognizing it.

    The sheer range of the magnetic forces that bind this judge with Mr Wike’s interests are well beyond the ordinary laws of both physics and judicial administration. Those forces were on full advertisement in the judgment on the Samuel Amatonjie case. First, the judge held that he did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter. Next, he held that Mr Amatonjie lacked the standing to bring the case anyway. Indeed, the judge held that the case was so void that “the originating process ought not to have been accepted for filing, let alone wasting the precious time of the court.”

    The case ought to have ended there. But the judge would not be assuaged, and his judgment, enthusiastically supported with the authority of Wikipedia, swiftly descended into farce.

    Turning to the requirement for the National Assembly to approve emergency rule by a joint resolution of two-thirds majority, James Omotosho ruled that “nowhere in section 305 of the Constitution is there any specific method” for reaching this resolution and, therefore, “if the National Assembly in their discretion decide to use voice votes in approving the proclamation, they are within their constitutional powers to do the same.” This must be a unique Omotosho version of the Constitution.

    Having held that he lacked jurisdiction and the claimant lacked standing to bring the case, James Omotosho, however, “dismissed” the case. But he reserved his best for last, rounding off with an audacious act of judicial malpractice by imposing costs of Nine Million Naira on the Plaintiff in favour of Respondents, each of whom was sued in institutional capacity.

    The only thing more bizarre than the jurisprudence or the orders that emanate from the court of James Omotosho is the predictability with which all cases affecting the political interests of Mr Wike at the Federal High Court improbably end up on his docket. That is a matter of à la carte law, which can only be explained by the troika of Mr Wike, his favourite judge, and the current Chief Judge of the Federal High Court.

    Some 190 years ago, when he wrote the classic, Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville devoted a chapter to “judicial power”, which he described as “a political power of the first order.” In the Court of James Omotosho, de Tocqueville finds his proof and the falsification of his thesis. The ends may be political, but can that also be said of the means by which they are procured?

    *A lawyer and a teacher, Odinkalu can be reached at chidi.odinkalu@tufts.edu*

  • NIGERIAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW TEACHERS AND THE PERSISTENT DISDAIN FOR ITS OWN BUSINESS, OBJECTIVES, AND MANDATE

    NIGERIAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW TEACHERS AND THE PERSISTENT DISDAIN FOR ITS OWN BUSINESS, OBJECTIVES, AND MANDATE

     

    –  A Wake-Up Call to the NALT Leadership

     

    By Sylvester Udemezue

    *(1). Introduction: A New Executive, the Same Old Culture*

    On 30 October 2024, following my lamentations on NALT’s persistent neglect of its own objectives while chasing after issues unrelated to its core mission, a colleague reassured me thus: “That is about to change. You were obviously absent at the manifesto programme today. The election of the new executive is coming up tomorrow.” That assurance sounded hopeful: a promise of reawakening. It suggested that NALT might finally confront the crisis of focus that has haunted it for decades. The next day a new leadership was installed for the NALT with huge promises of far-reaching reforms and positive changes. Sadly, one year later, after reviewing the papers presented at the just-concluded 56th Annual Conference of NALT, held at the University of Abuja (26–30 October 2025), one is compelled to ask: What has really changed? What tangible innovation has the current leadership of NALT introduced beyond organising another Annual General Conference where most papers once again have little or nothing to do with NALT’s constitutional objectives or the pressing challenges facing legal education in Nigeria?

    *(2). The Disconnect Between NALT’s Mandate and Its Conferences*

    The objectives of NALT, as enshrined in its Constitution, are clear: (i) to promote excellence in law teaching and research; (ii) to enhance legal education and pedagogy; (iii) to foster academic collaboration among law teachers; and (iv) to engage meaningfully with stakeholders on issues affecting the development, regulation, and quality of legal education in Nigeria. Yet, the 2025 Conference theme (“Law, National Development and Economic Sustainability in a Globalised World”) though lofty, is once again generic and detached from NALT’s true constituency. Out of the nineteen papers presented (four plenary and fifteen sessional), only a negligible few even tangentially touch on issues of law teaching, research, or education reform. Most others dwell on broad political and economic topics such as: Rejigging the Jurisprudence of Election Petition in Nigeria for National Integration and Cohesion; Challenges to Regional Cooperation for Economic Development; Economic Sustainability, State Sovereignty and the New World Order; and Examining the Implications of Nigerian Tax Reform Regime for National Development and Economic Sustainability.

    While intellectually commendable, these papers are far removed from NALT’s foundational purpose. They contribute little or nothing to ongoing crises in law teacher welfare, curriculum review, research standards, professional ethics, ICT integration, or institutional synergy.

    *(3). The Real Issues NALT Conferences Keep Ignoring*

    If NALT were faithful to its objectives, its conferences would engage with the core challenges confronting legal education in Nigeria: the very areas crying for reform and advocacy. Legal education in Nigeria currently faces a multiplicity of interconnected crises that have undermined its effectiveness and global competitiveness. Chief among these are: Inadequate funding of law faculties and legal education institutions; Shortage, poor welfare, and low motivation of academic staff, leading to brain drain; Inadequate infrastructure, including poorly equipped libraries, obsolete ICT tools, and overcrowded classrooms; Over-enrolment and unsustainable student–staff ratios; Outdated curriculum misaligned with global practice and professional demands; Weak linkage between law faculties, the Nigerian Law School, and the wider profession, producing a chronic skills gap; Proliferation of law faculties without quality assurance or proper accreditation; Frequent industrial actions and unstable academic calendars that disrupt learning; Poor research culture, weak publication output, and lack of institutional support; Deficient use of ICT and e-learning in pedagogy; Inadequate clinical legal education and practical skills training; Weak regulatory enforcement by the Council of Legal Education (CLE) and the National Universities Commission (NUC); Low motivation and career stagnation among law teachers; Rampant brain drain to other professions and countries; and Lack of alignment between legal-education outputs and the needs of the legal market and society, among others. These challenges are existential to the health of legal education; yet NALT conferences consistently sidestep them, preferring to debate elections, federalism, or tax policy.

    *(4). Leadership Without Legacy*

    The situation is worsened by NALT’s short two-year leadership cycle, which hardly allows for vision, continuity, or institutional reform. If every leadership’s main legacy is merely “organising the next conference,” then the National Executive Committee (NEC) might as well be renamed the Annual Conference Planning Committee. Where are NALT’s sustained dialogues with the CLE, NUC, or NBA on curriculum reform, academic ethics, or faculty development?
    Where are its policy papers or communiqués on teacher welfare, quality assurance, or technological adaptation in legal education, among numerous others? Without answers to these questions, NALT risks becoming an annual event without an annual impact.

    *(5). The Fifty Ignored Priorities: What NALT Should Be Discussing*

    The following fifty (50) pressing research and discussion areas have been lamentably overlooked at NALT’s Annual General Conferences, even though they lie at the very heart of NALT’s mandate and relevance: why is NALT’s leadership lifespan pegged at only 24 months, and what meaningful reforms can a leadership with such a short tenure realistically achieve? When will NALT amend its constitution to create a longer, more stable and impactful leadership structure? How do successive NALT leaderships feel after each conference without discussing topics central to the association’s raison d’être? Would the heavens fall if NALT’s conferences were redirected to tackle the real problems affecting its own constituency (law teachers, law students, and legal education institutions) rather than distant political and economic themes? For instance, NALT conferences should be examining: (1) how to prevent the rampant sex-for-marks syndrome that tarnishes the image of academia; (2) lecturers’ involvement in exam malpractices, such as the shocking incident of a law lecturer caught impersonating a student during Bar Part II examinations; (3) the mistreatment of law teachers within the legal profession, particularly the discriminatory Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN) Guidelines that marginalise academics; (4) the serious synergy deficit between law faculties, the Nigerian Law School, and the Council of Legal Education regarding admission, qualification, and professional preparation; (5) the growing role of Artificial Intelligence in law teaching and learning; (6) controversies surrounding university admission quotas; (7) accreditation standards for law faculties and their enforcement; (8) election malpractice and unethical political involvement of some law teachers; (9) curriculum review, update, and implementation to meet global standards; (10) pervasive corruption in the management of law faculties; (11) inadequate teaching and learning facilities; (12) the unhealthy proliferation of substandard law faculties; (13) poor funding of legal education; (14) the negative impact of recurring industrial actions and strikes on the continuity of legal training; (15) the development of practical teaching and learning tools; (16) incompetence and non-commitment among some law teachers; (17) exam malpractice within law faculties; (18) whether substantive and procedural law training should be unified or remain bifurcated; (19) the possible introduction of entrance examinations for the Nigerian Law School; (20) the merits and demerits of making law a second-degree course; (21) synergy between the Bar and academia and the role of practitioners in legal training; (22) utilisation of ICT for effective law teaching and learning; (23) motivation and welfare of law teachers; (24) the poor culture of legal research and weak institutional support; (25) essential skills for effective law teaching; (26) emerging law modules and modernising legal curricula; (27) whether Nigeria has too many or too few lawyers; (28) teacher–student relationship ethics and standards; (29) brain drain among law teachers; (30) the effect of insecurity on legal education; (31) the state of Legal English and whether it should be mandatory throughout undergraduate study; (32) self-assessment of law teaching methods; (33) curriculum development and implementation challenges; (34) piracy in academic publishing; (35) ethics and integrity in academic writing; (36) the fight against plagiarism; (37) the role and effectiveness of the NUC and CLE in regulating legal education; (38) comparative studies on global best practices in legal education regulation; (39) the role of law teachers in promoting justice, ethics, and good governance; (40) inter-faculty collaboration and synergy in legal education; (41) standards and transparency in the award of professorships; (42) management and administration of law faculties; (43) the development of mock and moot trial programmes; (44) externship and internship policies; (45) modes of delivery and management of law examinations; (46) balancing law teachers’ careers with their personal and family lives; (47) motivation and reward systems for outstanding law students; (48) the growth and sustainability of law clinics; (49) issues around sabbaticals and academic exchanges; and (50) other emerging issues crucial to the advancement of law teaching and learning in Nigeria. These fifty areas (though not exhaustive) reflect the true business of NALT and define the intellectual agenda that its conferences should prioritise if the Association must remain relevant, effective, and true to its founding objectives. These are the true businesses of NALT; not the endless recycling of general national topics that have no bearing on its statutory objectives.

    *(6). The Way Forward: Turning the Annual Conference into an Annual Conscience*

    NALT’s failure is not intellectual; it is directional. Its conferences overflow with talent, yet suffer from misplaced focus. To reclaim its relevance, NALT must redirect its agenda toward advancing legal education quality and pedagogy; fostering ethical teaching and research culture; strengthening synergy among regulatory bodies; improving teacher welfare, training, and motivation; and aligning legal education with the demands of a globalised legal market, among others. Until NALT transforms its Annual General Conference into an Annual General Conscience, it will remain eloquent but empty: rich in rhetoric, poor in relevance.
    Respectfully,
    Sylvester Udemezue (udems)
    Lawyer; Law Teacher; Member, NALT; &
    Proctor, Reality Ministry of Truth and Justice (TRM).
    08109024556. udems@therealityministry.ngo.

     


    About  Flowerbudnews
    Established by Hon.  Biola Lawal, a former Acting Managing Director of the News Agency of Nigeria (NAN), FLOWERBUDNEWS is a consortium of active veteran journalists, experienced Multimedia broadcast experts and image makers.

    We are drawn from both public and private sectors of Nigeria’s media Industry with a common  determination to enhance the practice of responsible journalism..

    Lawal, on his part, is also a former Honourable Commissioner for Information,Youth, Sports and Culture of Osun state, his home state.

    Biola Lawal had also successfully served two tenures as Press Secretary to the ECOMOG Force Commander in Liberia during the Liberian and Sierra Leone Civil wars. He was an outstanding NAN Defence and War Correspondent for many years.

    The retired NAN Acting Boss holds the honour of being the only journalist that served two terms on the ECOMOG international assignment due to his high professionalism and decency.

    He is a Co-Author of the book; ECOMOG, A BOLD ATTEMPT AT REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING! Edited Mrs Margaret Voght.  The book remains the most. factual, detailed and authentic account of the he ECOWAS sponsored ECOMOG Military operation.

  • LAW TEACHERS IN A TROUBLED NATION: A CALL TO AWAKEN FROM THE TRAGEDY OF DETACHED INTELLECTUALISM

    LAW TEACHERS IN A TROUBLED NATION: A CALL TO AWAKEN FROM THE TRAGEDY OF DETACHED INTELLECTUALISM

     

     

    By Sylvester Udemezue

    With utmost respect, it is difficult to avoid the observation that many Nigerian lawyers (including law teachers) often appear detached from the realities of the society in which they live and work. We sometimes carry on as though the social, political, and moral decay afflicting the wider society has no bearing on our profession or its institutions, as though we are immune from the vices and dysfunctions that define the national experience.

    This attitude, in my humble view, partly explains why legal education in Nigeria has not advanced at the pace or depth that the nation urgently requires.

    Consider, for instance, a situation where discussions or materials relating to issues of national insecurity are expressly prohibited on a law teachers’ social media platform. One cannot help but wonder: what could possibly justify such a stance?

    If law teachers are truly committed to genuine intellectual engagement, they should recognise that they occupy a strategic position among those who bear a moral and professional responsibility to help steer Nigeria away from insecurity, stagnation, and societal decay, away from the destructive grip of religious intolerance, ethnic chauvinism, and narrow-mindedness that continue to undermine our collective destiny.

    What is the true worth of academic research if it contributes little or nothing to addressing the pressing challenges confronting our society? Of what use are our so-called “intellectual discussions” if their impact is neither felt nor seen beyond our academic circles? What value does our knowledge as law teachers hold if we remain silent or indifferent to the problems plaguing our nation? How can we be relevant change agents when we prohibit discussions on issues that directly affect our students, our universities, and the very future of legal education?

    Every week, terrorists, bandits, and other violent groups attack schools and universities, killing, maiming, and abducting lecturers, students, and community members. Yet, in some quarters, discussions about these tragedies are treated as taboo, as though silence could insulate us from the consequences. Can we truly claim to be serious-minded scholars under such circumstances? With due respect, we cannot. Not until our intellectual efforts begin to resonate beyond our classrooms and journals: until they are seen and felt in the policies, values, and social transformations shaping our society.

    The truth is that Nigeria’s academia is often stifled by self-interest and careerism. Too many of our scholarly pursuits are aimed more at personal advancement than at national progress. Yet, the irony remains that genuine personal advancement is best achieved in a society that itself is advancing. We cannot rise above the moral, social, and institutional environment in which we live unless we want to run away as in JAPA. Legal education (like every other sector) will continue to struggle if we, its custodians, remain disconnected from the wider realities of our society. Legal education does not exist in isolation; it thrives only in a stable, progressive, and secure environment. We must, therefore, begin to ask ourselves some honest questions:

    (1). How many of our much-celebrated or Scopus-indexed publications have any measurable impact on our immediate communities?

    (2). How much of our scholarly discourse is directed toward finding real solutions to Nigeria’s myriad challenges?

    Among the direct consequences of our intellectual complacency and detached intellectualism is that, in the wider society (and even within the legal profession itself) law teachers are often perceived as making little or no impact on national development, the administration of justice, law practice, or the advancement of the legal profession in Nigeria. This perception, unfortunately, may have contributed to the recent decision of the Legal Practitioners’ Privileges Committee (LPPC) to restrict the number of law teachers awarded the coveted rank of Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN) to just one per year. A striking example of how law academics are viewed outside legal education circles can be seen in the comments of Jibrin Okutepa SAN. In a widely discussed public statement, he argued that many academics conferred with the SAN rank are “largely unknown,” and that their works are “neither well-known nor major sources of reference” in the legal profession. (See: Jibrin Okutepa, “Many Academics Conferred with SAN Title Are Unknown and Their Works Are Not Reference Points” TheNigeriaLawyer, 28 October 2023). According to him, the LPPC guidelines envisage that the rank be awarded to academics whose teaching, research, and publications make substantial contributions to legal practice and become major reference points for judges, lawyers, and students alike. However, he lamented that most academic SANs have failed to meet this standard, as their scholarship has little visibility or relevance in the practical development of law, policy, or justice delivery.(See: Jibrin Okutepa, “Reforming the Rank of Senior Advocates of Nigeria” Independent Nigeria, 16 October 2022).

    Whether or not one agrees with his tone, the substance of Okutepa’s criticism underscores a painful truth: legal academics in Nigeria are increasingly perceived as detached from the realities of practice and the pressing needs of the justice system and national development. Such perceptions, justified or not, should compel us to re-examine the focus and impact of our scholarship. Until we begin to align our intellectual energies with the urgent needs of our society, our collective relevance as lawyers and educators will remain in doubt, and the progress of legal education will continue to be slow, if not completely stagnant.

    The reality is that advancing personal academic careers and contributing to national development are not mutually exclusive pursuits. Indeed, it is entirely possible (and even desirable) for legal scholars to promote national progress through their research, intellectual discourse, and scholarly writings, while simultaneously achieving individual academic growth and career advancement. The two goals are complementary, not contradictory. The time has come, therefore, for deep introspection: and, more importantly, for deliberate action.

    Respectfully,
    Sylvester Udemezue (udems),
    Lawyer, Law Teacher and Proctor, The Reality Ministry of Truth Law and Justice (TRM)
    08021365545.
    udems@therealityministry.ngo.
    www.therealityministry.ngo.
    (04 November 2025)

  • Criminal Defamation or Criminal Intimidation: The Phantom Charges against Me

    Criminal Defamation or Criminal Intimidation: The Phantom Charges against Me

     

    *By Chinedu Agu

    It is no longer news that on Wednesday, 17th September 2025, I honoured the invitation by the X-Squad Unit of the Nigeria Police Force, Imo State Command, over allegations of “Criminal Defamation of the Governor of Imo State” and “conduct likely to cause a breach of the peace.”

    This account is not intended to sensationalize the matter, but rather to lay bare certain uncomfortable truths which I am prepared to stand by, as they are rooted in incontrovertible facts which demonstrate three clear points:

    1. The persecution against me was directly initiated by the Imo State Commissioner of Information.
    2. The so-called “civil society organisation” presented as the originator of the petition against me – Imo Democratic Alliance, allegedly coordinated by one Umukoro Marvis Udechukwu – does not exist in Nigeria. It is not registered and has no traceable office address anywhere in the country.
    3. But for the courage and professionalism of Magistrates in Imo State, and the overwhelming solidarity of lawyers, civil society organisations, and friends, I would have been languishing in detention much earlier.
    What follows should shed light on the rot, the decay, and the complicity that continue to fester in our Imo State.

    At 12:47 p.m. on 12 September 2025, my phone rang. The caller introduced himself as a police officer and asked if I was Chinedu Agu. Without hesitation, he informed me that there was a petition against me for “criminal defamation of His Excellency, the Governor of Imo State.” He further requested me to honour an invitation to appear before the X-Squad Unit of the State Police Command on Wednesday, 17th September 2025.
    Curious, I asked about the source of the petition. He replied that it came directly from the Imo State Ministry of Information and even went on to mention the name of the official who signed it.

    When I requested for a copy of the petition he responded I would have to “call Oga” for a copy. When I reached out, “Oga” categorically told me I could not be given a copy of the petition except I applied formally to the Commissioner of Police for a Certified True Copy (CTC).

    After we eventually settled on a date for my encounter with the X-Squad, the officer reluctantly sent an “Invitation Letter” to me via WhatsApp. That letter, bare as it was, stood as a symbol of something deeper – the rot and decay in our system, where power is wielded not to protect truth and justice, but to intimidate voices that dare to speak both.
    This refusal by the police to furnish a citizen with a copy of the petition forming the basis of his invitation raises grave constitutional and statutory issues. Under Section 36(6)(a) & (b) of the 1999 Constitution, every person facing criminal allegations has the right to be informed “promptly and in detail” of the nature of the offence, and to have adequate facilities for the preparation of his defence. Denying access to the petition until one applies for a CTC clearly violates this right.

    The Administration of Criminal Justice Law of Imo State, 2020 (ACJL) reinforces this. Section 8 of the ACJL guarantees fair hearing, while Section 17 mandates humane treatment and respect for the dignity of suspects. Transparency at the investigative stage is, therefore, not a matter of grace, but a constitutional and legal obligation.
    This practice, whereby the police serve an invitation letter yet withhold the petition that underpins it, fosters intimidation, secrecy, and abuse of power. It effectively disarms the citizen and turns what should be a fact-finding process into a trap.

    I digress.

    On the agreed date, I arrived at the station accompanied by a team of lawyers numbering about 72. I was ushered in together with Chief Chris Ihentuge, Chairman of the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA), Owerri Branch, and Chief H.N. Duroha, Chairman of the Sports Committee of the branch. A police officer, who introduced himself as the “2/IC”, laboured rather gratuitously to persuade us that the petition did not emanate from the Ministry of Information but rather from “Imo Democratic Alliance”. To convince us, he brought out a two-page petition and read the first page aloud. He then handed me over to the Investigating Police Officer (IPO) to whom the matter had been assigned.

    At the IPO’s office, he made to read the petition to me. I politely requested to personally peruse it. What I saw was a farce: a hastily contrived letterhead, garishly designed, with “IMO DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE” written in capital letters. Its motto, inscribed in red, declared “FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE.”

    On the top right corner of the page was a needless sketch of the map of Imo State. It bore no office or return address. The “petition” was dated 2 September 2025 and captioned, “Criminal Defamation of the Governor of Imo State and Incitement of the public against Imo State Government and the Police by Barr. Chinedu Agu.”

    The “petition” referred to two articles authored by me: the latter article, “Imo State – Where Justice in On Vacation During Court Vacation”, was published 31 August 2025. The earlier one, “Tears From Enugu: A Lawyer’s Heartbreaking Diary From a State That Works To a State In Ruins”, was published one day earlier on 30 August. The author alleged that I published both with the “intention to incite an insurrection against state institutions through the vicious provocation of the citizens”. It concluded by warning that “if Barr. Agu is not called to order now, he may be on his way to inciting the citizenry into violent action.” Critically, the author did not say how either article had incited anyone nor suggest how I was to be called to order.

    The petition was signed by one “Umukoro Marvis Udechukwu”, who claimed to be the “Co-ordinator” of the Imo Democratic Alliance.

    In my response, I pointed out that this petition did not disclose any offence known to law. On the accusation of “criminal defamation”, everything I wrote in my two pieces is factual and truth is a complete defence to defamation. I requested the IPO to retrieve and review the full texts and identify a single line that was untrue.
    I also added that the law does not permit a third party to lay such a complaint. Defamation is personal, and no busybody can initiate action in that regard. The fictitious organisation did not allege defamation of itself, nor did Umukoro Marvis Udechukwu allege defamation of his own person.

    Importantly, the so-called petition did not annex the articles complained of. Instead, it imported mutilated texts, using only those parts that suited its persecutorial purpose. As for the allegation of “inciting the public,” I also invited the police to point to a single line in my articles that did any such thing.

    Upon leaving the police, I immediately conducted a search on the portal of the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC). Imo Democratic Alliance is legally non-existent. It is not a registered organisation. To use such a phantom entity as source for a law enforcement procedure is itself criminal.
    On the evening prior to my scheduled encounter with the police on 17 September, I received credible information that my detention was already pre-determined. Indeed, the police made strenuous efforts to procure a magistrates’ signature for an order to detain me but none could be persuaded at the time to lend legitimacy to such illegality.
    Frustrated by that setback, and confronted with the overwhelming solidarity of more than seventy-two lawyers who accompanied me to the station, the police chose to release me on bail, on self-recognizance. It was a temporary respite.

    Thereafter, they fixed a fresh encounter for early afternoon on Tuesday, 23 September. I shall honour that invitation once again to see what new tricks they will conjure.

    One undeniable truth from this entire episode is that initiator of the police persecution against me is the Imo State Commissioner of Information. I welcome genuine legal process. I am not afraid of lawful process but I already suspect that is not what this is about.

    *A former secretary of the NBA, Owerri Branch, Chinedu Agu wrote this piece on 20th September 2025. Since 23rd September 2025 he has been detained at the direct instigation of the Imo State Government. He can be reached at ezeomeaku@gmail.com*

  • Nigeria: Supreme Enablers of Constitutional Outrage

    Nigeria: Supreme Enablers of Constitutional Outrage

     

    By Chidi Anselm Odinkalu

    *“The judiciary have a wide scope for making political decisions.”*

    *J.A.G. Griffiths, “Constitutional and Administrative Law’ in Peter Archer & Andrew Martin (Eds), More Law Reform Now, 55 (1983)*

    The judgment of the Supreme Court of Nigeria on 19 January 2006 concerning the state of emergency in Plateau State came down 20 months after the proclamation and 14 months after the emergency had expired. When it was eventually issued, the judgment was worse than an anti-climax. The most important thing about the decision was not the jurisprudence of the court but when the court chose to hear the case. Nearly two decades later, the same Court is likely to repeat a familiar script, serving as an apex enabler of power amok. The people of Rivers State are paying the price in the currency of constitutional outrage. As always, the facts matter.

    By Statutory Instrument No. 4 of 2004, issued on 18th May 2004, Nigeria’s president Olusegun Obasanjo, a retired four-star General, proclaimed a State of Emergency over Plateau State in north-central Nigeria. Known as the State of Emergency (Plateau State) Proclamation, S.I. No. 4 of 2004 it provided that “the State shall, for the duration of the emergency, be administered by an Administrator who shall be appointed by me and operate on the basis of such Regulations that may, from time to time, be issued by me.” The duration of the emergency proclamation was six months.

    At the time, President Obasanjo was elected on the platform of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP). Beyond the federal level, the same party ruled or controlled 28 out of the 36 states in Nigeria. Joshua Dariye, the governor suspended in Plateau State by the emergency, was also elected on the platform of the party.

    Having suspended the governor, his deputy and the Plateau State House of Assembly in exercise of powers purportedly exercised under the emergency, President Obasanjo appointed Maj.-General Chris Alli, a former Chief of Staff of the Nigerian Army, as the Emergency Administrator for Plateau State. The National Assembly quickly voted to afford the president the parliamentary reinforcement required under the constitution.

    In the name of Plateau State and its people, the suspended governor, Joshua Dariye, instructed legal proceedings invoking the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in respect of disputes between a state and the federal government. Among other prayers, he requested the Supreme Court to determine whether the relevant provisions of the Constitution and of the Emergency Powers Act of 1961 empowered the president to suspend elected officials of the state.

    The Supreme Court took its merry time before scheduling the case for argument. By the time it took arguments in the last quarter of the following year, the legal issues were still substantial, but the actual emergency had long lapsed. In its judgment, the Court ruled that the proceedings lacked the requisite legal standing because the suspended governor did not have the powers to instruct proceedings on behalf of Plateau State, and the Emergency Military Administrator had not authorized nor supported the case. It also added that as the emergency was spent, there was no longer any live dispute involved.

    This was diabolical judicial capitulation. If, as seemed evident, the court was clearly reluctant to get itself embroiled in the controversy, it would have struggled to find a more illogical piece of reasoning on which to justify casualizing the issue as a matter of institutional comfort for the judiciary.

    The most charitable anyone could be about the idea that the fate of the case should hang on the consent of the Military Administrator, the legality of whose appointment was in question, was that it was cynical jurisprudence. At the time of the judgment, in any case, the question of whether or not the president had the power to suspend elected state officials was not at all academic. Yet, through an act of commission that was deliberately made to look like a routine omission, the Supreme Court enabled the Plateau State emergency proclamation, setting a precedent that ransacked the constitution but which suited the essentially military temperament of a soldier and wartime General whose tolerance for being second-guessed by anyone was notoriously thin.

    Nearly two decades later, on 17th September 2025, Nigeria’s incumbent President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, issued an announcement lifting the six-month-old state of emergency that he had imposed on Rivers State on 18 March. The announcement coincided with the expiration of the period of six months. Repeating the precedent set by President Obasanjo in 2004, President Tinubu, in proclaiming the emergency in Rivers State, also suspended all elected state-level officials, including the state governor and the members of the Rivers State House of Assembly. Unlike the situation in 2004, however, the party of the president this time is the All-Progressives Congress (APC) and the elected state officials at the receiving end are in the PDP, which has been in opposition since 2015.

    At the National Assembly, which the Constitution requires to ratify the emergency proclamation by a qualified (two-thirds) majority, both chambers passed it by a voice vote. This made it impossible to compute compliance with the constitutional arithmetic for lawful emergency proclamation. Naturally, therefore, the matter was fated to end up in controversy.

    President Tinubu acknowledged as much in his announcement of the end of the Rivers State emergency, confessing awareness of the fact that there were “over 40 cases in the courts in Abuja, Port Harcourt, and Yenagoa, to invalidate the declaration.” With a touch of presidential hubris, he added that “that is the way it should be in a democratic setting. Some cases are still pending in the courts as of today.”

    Most of the courts that have decided on the case did so by way of rulings designed to ensure that there was no judgment. One of the cases pending in the courts is SC/CV/329/2025, filed on 9th April 2025, three weeks after the emergency proclamation in Rivers State, by 11 PDP State governors. Their intervention ensured that the case avoided the delays inherent in navigating the lower rungs of the judicial ladder. There was good reason to believe that the court would give the matter timely consideration.

    On 3rd March 2023, the Supreme Court decided Suit No. SC/CV/162/2023 was instituted by 10 States exactly one month earlier, on 3 February, to challenge the redesign of the national currency on the eve of the 2023 elections.

    The following year, the same court took exactly 45 days to decide on 11th July, the case on local government autonomy filed by the Federal Government against the states on 25 May 2025.

    If the hope of the PDP governors in the Rivers State case was to give the apex court a timely opportunity to adjudicate the matter, it was misplaced. When the Plateau State emergency case was being given the judicial runaround under President Obasanjo two decades earlier, Rivers State was one of the poster boys of the PDP administration. This time, the state is a political prize for which the incumbent president is willing to mint a currency entirely of his own making. The Supreme Court has enabled him to have his way as he pleases, with neither care nor heed for what the constitution requires.

    As I write, the Supreme Court is still twiddling its elevated judicial thumbs while evidently divining the magical body language of the presidency. The court has chosen to enable emergency rule of manifestly dubious constitutionality by allowing the clock to run out on the proclamation. Its choice of that course of action has been both wilful and cynical. It is also clearly political.

    The administrative feint of the Supreme Court in kicking the Rivers State emergency case into the judicial long grass is a piece of judicial legerdemain whose place in the pantheon of judicial infamy is assured. It is also a piece of catastrophic success for the administration. With Supreme benediction, every elected state official now holds office at the sufferance of the presidency. The true scale of its perverse consequences for constitutional government in Nigeria will become apparent as the 2027 elections approach.

    *A lawyer and a teacher, Odinkalu can be reached at chidi.odinkalu@tufts.edu*