Wars often reveal the true strength and limitations of international alliances and partnerships. During the 12-day war of June 2025, Iran was left to fight largely on its own.
Apart from backing from Yemen’s Houthis, officially known as Ansar Allah, hardly any actors came to Tehran’s aid. The absence of meaningful action from China and Russia left many in Iran bitterly disappointed.
Now, as the United States and Israel again wage war against Iran, the conflict is forcing a renewed examination of Tehran’s partnerships with Beijing and Moscow, and the extent to which the Chinese and Russians are willing to stand by the Islamic Republic.
Beijing and Moscow’s early reactions
In response to the launch of Operation Epic Fury late last month, the Chinese and Russian authorities issued strong condemnations of the United States and Israel.
On 28 February, Chinese officials expressed deep concern but waited until the following day for China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, to condemn the American and Israeli bombing of Iran as unacceptable.
He called for an immediate ceasefire and a return to diplomatic talks. Speaking by phone with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, Wang also denounced the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as the “blatant killing of a sovereign leader”.
A week later, Beijing’s top diplomat warned that “plotting a ‘colour’ revolution or seeking government change will find no popular support” in Iran, while urging the international community to respect Iran’s sovereignty and calling on Washington and Tel Aviv to halt their military operations immediately.
Moscow responded in much the same vein. Russia’s Foreign Affairs Ministry condemned the American–Israeli assault on Iran as a “pre-planned and unprovoked act of armed aggression against a sovereign and independent UN member state”. President Vladimir Putin likewise denounced the assassination of Khamenei as a “cynical murder”.
On 9 March, Putin sent Iran’s new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, a message of support. “I would like to reaffirm our unwavering support for Tehran and solidarity with our Iranian friends,” wrote the Russian leader, who added that “Russia has been and will remain a reliable partner” to Iran.
“At a time when Iran is confronting armed aggression, your tenure in this high position will undoubtedly require great courage and dedication,” added Putin.
Throughout this war, Iran’s leadership has stressed the importance of Tehran’s partnership with Moscow. On 8 March, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told NBC News’ “Meet the Press” that “cooperation between Iran and Russia is not something new, it’s not a secret” and that the Russians “are helping us in many different directions”.
Why China and Russia remain cautious
Not even two weeks into the war, predicting how events in the region will unfold is extremely difficult. Nonetheless, there is likely good reason to expect that China and Russia will tread carefully to avoid becoming too entangled in the United States-Israel-Iran conflict.
In Beijing’s case, its capacity to deter the American-Israeli alliance is extremely limited. While China wields significant economic influence in the Middle East, its willingness to intervene in regional crises through hard-power measures is low.
A key factor is Beijing’s desire to avoid direct confrontation with Washington. Thus, although Iran’s missile program depends on Chinese technology, there is no guarantee that Beijing would supply missiles to Tehran while the war continues.
President Xi Jinping will host Trump in China from 31 March to 2 April, and Beijing’s leadership will likely avoid responding to Middle East conflict dynamics in ways that could further complicate the delicate issues in China-US relations that the two leaders are set to address in person.
“For the Chinese, the war is a lower priority than the Trump-Xi meeting at the end of March, where tariffs are expected to be discussed, among other issues. Again, supporting Iran overtly with military aid will only jeopardise the meeting,” explained Dr Li-Chen Sim, an Associate Fellow at the US-based Middle East Institute, in an interview with The New Arab.
“China has ample supplies of oil in strategic and commercial reserves – enough to last three to four months – and they can engage in fuel switching from LNG to coal/pipeline gas from Russia and Myanmar in power plants to mitigate any prolonged supply issues from Qatar,” she added.
Russia appears to be doing more than China to assist Iran in tangible ways. Moscow is reportedly providing Tehran with intelligence on the locations and movements of US troops, ships, and aircraft.
These disclosures mark the first indication that Moscow may be seeking to involve itself in the United States-Israel-Iran war. Much of the shared information has reportedly come from Russia’s advanced network of reconnaissance satellites.
However, it remains unclear what, if anything, Russia is receiving in return for this assistance, or whether any individual Iranian strike can be directly traced to Moscow’s targeting intelligence.
Nonetheless, several Iranian drones have hit sites where there was a presence of US military forces. On 1 March, an Iranian drone struck a facility housing American personnel in Kuwait, killing six US service members.
In any event, such reports about Russia assisting Iran with intelligence sharing highlight how Moscow continues to maintain a close relationship with Tehran, especially within the context of Iranian support for Russia in the Ukraine war.
Still, as some analysts have noted, Russia’s involvement in this conflict is, like China’s, largely about issuing statements condemning Washington and Tel Aviv’s aggression against Iran.
Moscow’s overall calculus is that there is much to gain from Western powers becoming distracted by this war in the Middle East because that means the “less stringently secondary sanctions over its oil trade will be enforced – and this will present more wiggle room for China and India, its erstwhile customers, to buy its oil without too much fear of penalties,” Dr Sim told TNA.
“The longer the war lasts, the fewer missiles the United States, Europe, and the United Kingdom can sell/transfer to Ukraine, a theatre that is more important to Russia than the Middle East. Consequently, the United States, Europe, and the United Kingdom will prioritise replenishing their own missile stocks over providing supplies to Ukraine,” she noted.
Additionally, Dr Sim pointed out that the Northern Sea Route via Russia becomes more attractive as uncertainty over the Strait of Hormuz persists, ultimately making it easier for the Russians to, over time, reestablish their oil and LNG resources as credible alternatives to Middle Eastern hydrocarbon supplies.
“[Russia] supporting Iran with overt military help at this point in time will jeopardise all of the above considerations,” she told TNA.
“About the only thing Iran can count on is diplomatic outreach from Moscow and Beijing. They’re not going to go to bat for Iran militarily,” explained John Feffer, director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Washington, DC-based Institute for Policy Studies.
“Sure, Russia sells weapons to Iran, and China supplies some dual-use tech. But Israel has led these attacks in part because it has calculated that Iran is quite isolated,” he added.
Economic stakes and regional stability
None of this suggests that China and Russia lack high stakes in the conflict. Beijing is deeply concerned about long-term instability in the Gulf, largely for economic reasons. As the world’s largest importer of crude oil, China remains heavily reliant on the Middle East as a cornerstone of its energy supply.
In recent years, roughly 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports have been directed to China, often at discounted prices that allowed Beijing to cushion sanctions-related risks and fluctuations in global markets.
As some analysts note, however, what once served as a strategic advantage has increasingly become a source of vulnerability. Even the mere prospect of disruption in the Strait of Hormuz can send insurance premiums soaring, force tankers onto longer routes, and inject fresh volatility into global markets.
Asian manufacturing economies are especially sensitive to sustained oil price increases. China’s economic model continues to depend heavily on industrial output and exports, meaning that rising energy costs come with tangible political risks.
For Russia, one of the greatest concerns is the potential collapse of the Iranian state, which Trump recently stated is a probable outcome of this war. Instability stemming from a fragmented Iran could spill across neighbouring countries, potentially affecting the Caucasus and Central Asia. Put simply, for Moscow, the prospect of chaos in Iran hits uncomfortably close to home.
China and Russia also have strong interests in maintaining peace and stability among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states – all six of which have been targeted by Iran’s retaliatory strikes.
With Beijing and Moscow maintaining extensive economic and diplomatic ties with the Gulf monarchies, and with many of their citizens living in Dubai and other GCC cities, there is no denying that Iran’s actions since 28 February have alarmed both powers.
All these factors help explain why Putin has sought to convince Trump that winding down this war as quickly as possible is necessary. On 9 March, the two leaders had their first phone conversation since the current war on Iran began.
In what Trump said was a “very good call,” he and Putin addressed Iran and Ukraine. According to the Russian president’s foreign policy adviser, Yuri Ushakov, Putin set forth “several proposals” for concluding the US-Israel-Iran conflict.
A more China-oriented Middle East?
Despite their vested interests in seeing the conflict wind down, China and Russia will likely judge that maintaining distance from the United States-Israel-Iran war best serves their strategic goals, given the risks of deeper involvement.
At the same time, both powers may take heart in the prospect of a more multipolar, less West-centric world emerging once the dust settles.
With the Islamic Republic’s third Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, now at the helm, Iran is extremely unlikely to have any opening to the West at any point in the foreseeable future. This means that Tehran is set to further double down on its ‘Look East’ foreign policy orientation.
The GCC states, while angry at Washington for initiating what Gulf Arabs overwhelmingly see as an unnecessary and reckless war that undermined their security, despite diplomatic efforts by GCC members, especially Oman, to avert it, will likely feel greater urgency in pursuing a higher level of autonomy from the United States.
How much this dynamic will draw the Gulf states closer to China and Russia remains uncertain, but it is a serious possibility given their declining confidence in Washington’s ability to act as a reliable security guarantor and promoter of regional stability.
Beyond the Gulf and the wider Arab world, Washington’s latest war of choice in the Middle East carries significant geopolitical ramifications that extend far beyond the immediate conflict.
“The Global South is looking for a power that can counterbalance the erratic United States. China, more so than the BRICS, has cohesive policies and the resources to serve as a stabilising force in geopolitics. This Iran War could be a turning point in terms of the balance of power on war and peace issues,” concluded Feffer.