*Between Rhetoric and Re
By Sylvester Udemezue
Expressions such as “I felt like killing him” or “I felt like shooting him” are, within the ordinary fabric of human communication, widely understood as figurative and emotional outbursts, not literal threats, particularly when uttered in moments of anger, frustration, or strong disapproval.
They belong to the realm of rhetorical exaggeration (hyperbole), employed to convey the depth of one’s feelings rather than any actual intention to inflict harm. In everyday conversational settings, such expressions are typically innocuous. They are interpreted as linguistic devices used to underscore displeasure. A person emerging from a heated disagreement may, for instance, say, “I felt like killing him,” not to suggest any contemplated act of violence, but merely to emphasize the intensity of their emotional reaction. In such contexts, no legal or practical consequence ordinarily arises.
However, it must be emphasized, indeed, it cannot be overstated, that context is the lifeblood of meaning. Words do not exist in isolation; their significance is shaped by the circumstances in which they are used.
The same expression may assume vastly different implications depending on factors such as tone, setting, audience, and accompanying conduct. A remark made in jest among friends may be harmless, whereas the same words uttered in anger, directed at a specific individual, or accompanied by prior hostility or threatening behaviour, may acquire a more serious connotation.
Where such expressions are reinforced by repeated utterances, suggestive conduct, or surrounding circumstances capable of instilling fear, they may, in appropriate cases, be construed as a credible threat. From a legal perspective, both under Nigerian law and within broader common law jurisprudence, the principle is settled: a mere emotional or figurative expression does not, without more, constitute a criminal offence. However, where a statement gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of harm or conveys a genuine intention to cause injury, it may cross the threshold into criminal intimidation or assault (in the sense of placing another in fear of imminent harm). The governing test is objective:
Would a reasonable person, in the circumstances, interpret the statement as a real and credible threat?
It is against this analytical and legal backdrop that the remark attributed to Mr Nyesom Wike concerning Mr Seun Okinbaloye ought to be examined. In my respectful view, it is both difficult and, with respect, unreasonable to construe Mr Wike’s use of the word “shooting” as conveying any literal or physical intention. What he said is, in substance, consistent with expressions commonly used in everyday discourse to convey strong dissatisfaction or disapproval. It reflects intensity of sentiment, not an intention to harm.
For the avoidance of doubt, I hold no brief for Mr Wike. Nor do I necessarily endorse his style of communication, which may fairly be described as forceful and, at times, inelegant. However, intellectual honesty and fairness require that we distinguish between rhetorical excess and actual threat. A careful, dispassionate, and objective reading of the statement suggests that Mr Wike was merely expressing strong displeasure, whether with the substance of Mr Okinbaloye’s views or the manner in which those views were articulated on the programme in question.
One may legitimately disagree with Mr Wike. One may criticise his tone. But to elevate such an expression into a threat of violence is, with respect, a conclusion that does not withstand logical scrutiny. It stretches interpretation beyond reasonable bounds and risks fostering misunderstanding where none need exist.
That said, it must equally be acknowledged that within professional, political, and media environments, such expressions are often considered imprudent, ill-advised, and potentially damaging. Even where they fall short of criminality, they may attract public backlash, invite misinterpretation, and adversely affect reputation. Public officials, by virtue of their position and influence, bear a heightened responsibility to communicate with restraint, clarity, and sensitivity.
It is also imperative to underscore, as a matter of fundamental constitutional principle, that politicians and public office holders must, at all times, respect and uphold the rights to freedom of speech and expression, as well as the freedom of dissent. These freedoms are not mere privileges; they are indispensable pillars of any functioning constitutional democracy. The right of journalists, broadcasters, and members of the public to freely hold, express, and disseminate opinions on matters of public interest must be jealously guarded and consistently respected. Democracy thrives not on uniformity of opinion, but on the robust exchange of ideas, criticism, and divergent viewpoints. Strong disagreement is not a threat to democracy; it is one of its defining features.
Accordingly, expressions, whether verbal or implied, what may be perceived as suppressive, intimidating, or dismissive of dissent must be approached with caution, particularly by those entrusted with public authority. The practical takeaway, therefore, is both simple and significant: While such expressions are not inherently literal, they are context-sensitive and potentially risky. What may be harmless in informal conversation can, in a different setting, assume legal or reputational significance if it is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a real threat.
Ultimately, in an era marked by heightened sensitivity and instantaneous dissemination of information, we owe ourselves, and the society we seek to build, a duty of measured judgment, intellectual discipline, and interpretive restraint. Not every forceful expression should be hastily politicised or sensationalised. Each situation must be assessed on its own merit, guided by reason, fairness, context, and a commitment to truth.
Respectfully,
Sylvester Udemezue (Udems).
08021365545
udems@therealityministry.ngo.
(06 April 2026)