By Sylvester Udemezue
Political defection has become one of the most visible and troubling features of Nigeria’s democratic experience. Elected officials routinely abandon the political platforms on which they were voted into office, often without ideological justification and with little or no consequence. While this phenomenon is frequently explained as the product of personal ambition, greed, or political immorality, such explanations are ultimately superficial. They describe what is happening, but fail to explain why it persists.
This article advances a more fundamental thesis: rampant political defections in Nigeria are not primarily a moral failure of politicians, but a structural failure of the legal and institutional system. Until Nigeria builds strong, credible, and impregnable systems capable of restraining ambition and enforcing political discipline, defections will remain rational, frequent, and inevitable, regardless of individual intentions. Rampant defections from political parties in Nigeria are therefore not merely acts of political opportunism; they are symptoms of a much deeper malaise, the absence of strong, predictable, and incorruptible legal and institutional frameworks.
Indeed, the only major Nigerian politician I can readily recall who has not personally engaged in defection is the current President of Nigeria, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu.
In saner climes, political defections are rare and usually driven by principled ideological disagreements. In Nigeria, however, defection has become routine, strategic, transactional, and often defensive. Several interrelated factors account for this disturbing and persistent trend.
1. *Absence of Ideology within Political Parties:* Political parties in Nigeria are largely devoid of coherent ideology. They are, in most cases, mere assemblages of individuals pursuing personal, sectional, or momentary interests. Nothing substantial binds party members together beyond convenience. Even within the same party, factions constantly battle one another. These internal conflicts are rarely about ideas, policy direction, or national development; rather, they revolve around struggles for dominance, access to power, and control of party machinery. Where ideology is absent, loyalty is fragile. Defection therefore becomes not an aberration, but a predictable outcome.
2. *Self-Interest as a Major Motivation for Party Membership:* For many politicians, party membership is not about advancing party ideals or serving the nation. It is often about securing a platform to contest elections, gaining access to power, evading accountability, attracting patronage, or protecting narrow personal interests. When these expectations are threatened or frustrated, defection becomes a convenient escape route. Political parties thus function less as vehicles for collective purpose and more as instruments for personal survival and advancement.
3. *Weak Internal Party Democracy and Procedural Injustice:* Beyond ideology, even basic internal party democracy is largely absent. Party primaries are frequently manipulated; candidates are imposed; party constitutions are disregarded; and internal dispute-resolution mechanisms are either weak or non-existent. Many defections are therefore reactions to procedural injustice within parties. Where a party cannot guarantee fairness in its own internal processes, exit becomes a rational response rather than a moral failure.
4. *Scarcity of Genuine Commitment:* A party member who genuinely joins a political party to build it, reform it, and advance national development is unlikely to defect at the slightest inconvenience. If everyone abandons a party at the first sign of adversity, who remains to nurture, reform, and grow it? Rampant defection therefore exposes not only weak institutions, but also the scarcity of genuine ideological and civic commitment within Nigeria’s political class.
5. *The Pull of the Ruling Party and Institutional Failure:* One of the most powerful drivers of defection is the overwhelming urge to align with the ruling party. This impulse is rooted in the dysfunctionality of Nigeria’s institutions and the winner-takes-all character of the Nigerian state:
(A) *Weaponisation of Anti-Corruption Agencies:* If institutions such as the EFCC and ICPC were truly independent and insulated from executive influence (if they investigated and prosecuted wrongdoing without fear or favour) opposition politics would be safer and defections would significantly reduce. One undeniable reason for defection is fear of selective persecution. The now-infamous political maxim attributed to Adams Oshiomhole (“your sins will be forgiven if you join our party”) captures this reality with disturbing accuracy. Where anti-corruption agencies are perceived as tools of political coercion, opposition becomes a dangerous enterprise.
(B) *Electoral Insecurity and Lack of Confidence in INEC:* If the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) were truly independent, impartial, and immune from political manipulation, opposition politicians would have greater confidence in remaining outside the ruling party. However, there is a widespread belief (rightly or wrongly) that the ruling party, particularly at the federal level, possesses both the capacity and the willingness to influence electoral outcomes.
Recent developments underscore this concern: some politicians reportedly defect after being promised automatic tickets and assured electoral success. In saner climes, flying the flag of the ruling party guarantees nothing. In Nigeria, such assurances raise a troubling question: how can anyone confidently promise victory in a general election unless they possess the power to influence the process? Even the perception that this is possible is enough to drive defections.
6. *Fear of Post-Tenure Vulnerability:* Closely related is the fear of life after office. Nigeria lacks a dignified and secure political retirement culture. Once a politician leaves power, protection evaporates, influence fades, and exposure increases. Defection therefore functions as post-tenure insurance. Politicians align with power not merely to win elections, but to survive politically (and sometimes physically) after office.
7. *Godfatherism and Patron-Client Politics:* Nigeria’s politics is not institution-driven; it is person-driven. Loyalty is often vertical (to godfathers and patrons), not horizontal (to parties or institutions). When a godfather defects, falls out with power, or relocates politically, followers migrate en masse. This reinforces the uncomfortable reality that individuals are stronger than institutions: a condition fundamentally incompatible with stable democracy.
8. *Absence of Consequences for Defection:* Nigeria effectively rewards defection and punishes loyalty. Constitutional provisions meant to deter defection are easily circumvented through contrived claims of factionalisation. There are no meaningful voter sanctions, moral stigma, or enforceable legal consequences. Once defection carries no cost, it becomes a rational political strategy rather than a deviant act.
9. *Weak Systems as the Root Cause: Self-Interest as Symptom, Not Cause:* It is often argued that political defection in Nigeria is driven primarily by selfishness, ambition, and sectional interests. While this is true at a surface level, it mistakes symptoms for causes. Self-interest thrives not because Nigerian politicians are uniquely selfish, but because Nigeria’s legal and institutional systems are weak, elastic, and easily manipulable. Where systems are strong and impregnable, personal ambition (whether noble or selfish) is compelled to submit to institutional discipline.
A powerful illustration is *section 285 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999.* Despite the well-known selfishness and ambition of lawyers, politicians, judges, and litigants in election matters, the rigid constitutional timelines have successfully tamed all actors. The desire to delay proceedings exists; the incentive to manipulate timelines is real. Yet no one succeeds: not because human nature has changed, but because the system does not permit it.
Section 285 leaves no room for discretion, sentiment, influence, or manipulation. Personal interest suffocates where institutional design is firm. This demonstrates a crucial truth: human nature has not changed; the system has constrained it. Accordingly, Nigeria suffers rampant political defections not because politicians are uniquely selfish, but because the system permits selfishness to flourish. Where laws are weak, self-interest breathes freely; where laws are firm, clear, and self-enforcing, self-interest is disciplined.
10. *Judicial Uncertainty and Electoral Litigation Chaos:* Prolonged election petitions, unpredictable judgments, and perceived political influence over the judiciary further weaken confidence in the system. Rather than trust courts to resolve disputes fairly and promptly, politicians often prefer to defect pre-emptively and avoid litigation uncertainty altogether.
*SUGGESTED SOLUTION*
Reform the system. Make it fair. Make it impregnable.
Consider the United States: defections are rare not because politicians are morally superior, but because the system is strong. Institutions are stronger than individuals. Being in the ruling party does not guarantee undue advantage, and leaders cannot easily bend institutions to personal will. In Nigeria, the reverse is true. Leaders dominate institutions, and institutions are routinely manipulated for personal and political ends. Under such conditions, the logic of “if you can’t beat them, join them” becomes dominant rather than exceptional.
*CONCLUSION*
Political defection in Nigeria is not merely a moral failure of individual politicians; it is a structural and institutional failure. Our laws and institutions are too weak and too manipulable to guarantee fairness, protect dissent, or ensure a level playing field. As a result, politicians increasingly seek safety under powerful individuals rather than protection under impartial institutions. The painful reality is that Nigeria is governed more by persons than by laws. Until this dangerous imbalance is reversed (until institutions become stronger than individuals) political defections will persist, democratic stability will remain fragile, and genuine national progress will continue to elude us.
Respectfully,
*Sylvester Udemezue (Udems)*
lawmentorng@gmail.com.
(22 January 2026)
