In its April 11, 1994 edition, Newswatch published an interview with David Mark who had just been retired from the Army. Below are parts of the interesting interview:
Newstwatch: Are you suggesting that Babangida was used to annul the June 12 election?
Mark: I am suggesting that the main beneficiary of the annulment is General (Sani) Abacha.
Newswatch: How?
Mark: It is simple. Had the transition to democracy been successful, Abacha would have retired with Babangida’s administration and would not have become the Head of State today.
Newstwatch: It is said that you were involved with the military’s return to power on November 17 with General Abacha as head of state. What do you say to that if indeed as you said you are for democracy?
Mark: It is not yet time for me to say who was involved and who played what role but suffice to say for now that Abacha’s regime qualifies for a space in the Guinness Book of Records as the greatest betrayal of the century. It is a betrayal of the military officers involved, it is a betrayal of the CD (Campaign for Democracy) and CLO (Civil Liberties Organization) and it is a betrayal of hope and aspirations for all Nigerians. It is a betrayal of democracy. It was not a c0up against the ING (Interim National Government), it turned out it was a c0up against democracy, supported and nourished by politicians who behave like chameleons. Surprisingly it was Abiola’s close associates who were urging Abacha to take over. They dined with Abiola in the afternoon but in the night urged Abacha to seize power and forget June 12. I never believed that human beings could be so treacherous, unprincipled, and shameless.
Newswatch: Can you elaborate?
Mark: It is a betrayal because what the administration is doing now is the exact opposite of what we agreed and what we set out to do. It is a complete turn around. I am so disappointed that I had to write a letter to General (Oladipupo) Diya on it.
Newswatch: What happened?
Mark: When we saw that things were getting out of control in the country and it had become obvious that the interim government could not hold an election and the ship of state was drifting precariously, we reluctantly decided that the military should again intervene. When we met, we considered three possible options. The first option was to give Shonekan and his team the teeth to be able to bite and conduct the presidential election successfully as was in the transition programme. The second option was to go for a short but full military regime for six months and conduct only the presidential election thereafter. And the third option was a mixed grill, a diluted military regime for no more than one year, culminating again in a presidential election.
Most of us favoured option one for obvious reasons. We believed that Nigeria at that time, was not in the mood for a military regime. People were no longer prepared to tolerate the military. In addition, most of us were acutely aware that the entire world was moving toward democracy. The dramatic effects of the last few years-the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the rise of democratic movements around the world clearly galvanised that point.
Newswatch: How were you to accomplish this?
Mark: We were to accomplish option one by openly telling the nation that the military was strongly behind Shonekan and his team in their effort to complete the transition programme successfully. General Abacha was to make the announcement and warn the State Governments that were not cooperating that they risked being removed and state of emergency being declared in their states. We were to be emphatic and unequivocal in our support for Shonekan and his team. But surprisingly the Governors did not want Shonekan to succeed. They made Abacha’s home their pilgrimage point and urged Abacha to take over power.
The second option was a short full fledged military regime for six months – we discarded this for obvious reasons, some of which I have already told you.
This option presented more problems than we could handle at that time. The problems included possible economic sanctions from the western world, head on collision with the international monetary and financial institutions; if at that late stage in our march towards democracy we returned to military government again, it would completely undermine our leadership role in the African continent. And more importantly there was the possibility of being disgraced out of office by a civilian uprising. We were not even sure that the soldiers in the barracks who had also witnessed the move toward democracy around the world, would be supportive. Why should they anyway when their condition is worse off in a military regime? And we realised sadly too that the solution to our economic and political problems could not be solved by simple military decree.
The third option, which was a longer one, was a diluted military arrangement for no more than one year. Within this one year we were to conduct all the elections from local government chairmanship to the presidential. After all, Obasanjo and Yar’Adua did their elections in one year; therefore there was no reason why we could not have done the same.
In all the three options, there were a few constants. The two political parties were to remain, although they could be renamed if the politicians so desired, government was to stop funding the political parties. Parties were to fund themselves, the parties were not to be treated as government parastatals. The parties were to refund N100 million each back to the government. Independent candidacy was to be allowed in all the elections and as much as possible each of the two political parties was to nominate a southern presidential candidate for obvious reasons.
Newstwatch: By southern Presidential candidate do you mean a Yoruba?
Mark: No not necessarily, I mean a candidate from the Southern part of Nigeria. He could be Igbo or any Southern minority.
Newswatch: You did not appear to have settled on any of the three options. What we now have bears no resemblance to all the careful calculations. What happened?
Mark: Yes we did settle on an option. At the end of a stormy debate, we favoured option one which marked the beginning of a major disagreement within the group. Eventually, General Abacha and Diya reluctantly agreed but with the proviso that Diya “would sound out the CD, CLO, Yoruba leaders of thought, the elders, and the Obas to see if option three would be acceptable.” Diya confirmed that he sent Onagoruwa to meet the Ala’afin and to tell him that the Ooni was opposed to a military regime in hope thereby to get his support, since Diya knew the two traditional rulers rarely agreed on any one issue. He also added that he had discussed with Jakande who was prepared to abandon Abiola if he was offered the position of Minister of External Affairs or Finance. Diya maintained that most Yoruba leaders would settle on any other Yoruba man, apart from an Egbaman, as a presidential candidate. He eventually assured us that after an extensive consultation with Gani, Beko, Falana, Onagoruwa, the CLO, CD, the elders, the Obas, and the leaders of thought, they agreed to support total military regime for no less than five years to put the economy right. He then arranged for Onagoruwa to go and thank all those involved as well as seek the support of other eminent Yorubas.
Newswatch: Was Diya’s assurance of the support of the Yoruba all you needed to adopt option three?
Mark: Yes, option three, as originally conceived, that is for one year because our concern at that state was how best to defuse the tension in the western part of the country and assure the Yorubas that there was no plan to deliberately deny them or any section of the country, for that matter, the presidency.
Like I said earlier we were also worried about the popularity and support of the CD and CLO in the Yoruba speaking area. Happily we were assured that Onagoruwa had taken care of that sector.
Newswatch: If all of you were anxious for democracy, did you consider reversing the annulment of the June 12 election?
Mark: No.
Newswatch: Why?
Mark: Because after Diya, consulted with the Yoruba leaders of thought, they unanimously and unequivocally agreed to forego June 12 and instead opted for a military government. It was at this point that Diya again raised the issue of discarding option one because Chief Shonekan would deliberately ensure that Abiola was one of the presidential candidates. He said that would be against the wishes of the Obas and the Yoruba leaders of thought.
Courtesy:
ℹ️Ethnic African Stories
