By Richard Ikiebe
I am neither Igbo nor an Igbo apologist. But Nigeria’s recurring ethnic stone-throwing habit raises a necessary question: why do the Igbo so easily become targets? My objective is not to defend a people presumed innocent of every fault. Rather, I am seeking to understand how their strengths, contradictions and history became grounds for collective indictment.
My quest travels beyond the blame traders. How much is prejudice, how much is self-inflicted? And why are characteristics tolerated in other Nigerian ethnic groups so hastily treated as unforgivable for the Igbo? Why are they always made to carry so heavy a communal burden?
The Igbo are among Nigeria’s most mobile and conspicuously entrepreneurial peoples. Their migration and commercial rebuilding after the civil war testify to resilience. But mobility and cosmopolitanism are not necessarily the same thing. Living among others does not automatically dissolve attachment to one’s own community.
The visibility of Igbo makes them available targets. Commercial achievement attracts admiration and resentment; competition over opportunity then acquires colourful ethnic vocabulary. The lone trader becomes a representative of his people, his success evidence of encroachment, his misconduct evidence of collective character.
The charge of sectarianism against the Igbo should not be automatically dismissed. Their solidarity can become exclusionary. But which major ethnic group is free of sectarian tendency? Are Yoruba or Fulani attachments inherently less factional, or merely described more indulgently? Do the comparable conducts of other ethnic groups attract comparable judgement?
Perhaps it was Frederick Lugard who, over a century ago, cast the first stone when he dismissed the Igbo as having failed to advance beyond “primitive savagery”. Ironically, Lugard’s judgement more aptly exposed his own limitation and that of his framework. He was mistakenly measuring the Igbo’s (different) political system and structure against centralised authority and recognisable hierarchies that he was used to.
Northern emirates had supplied Lugard with rulers, courts and administrative structures through which British authority could operate. Much of Igboland offered no equivalent hierarchies. Authority was dispersed among numerous assemblies, title holders, age grades and religious institutions. Onitsha and Oguta had monarchical traditions, but no ruler spoke for all Igbo communities. Colonial officials mistook the absence of their preferred kind of ruler for an absence of governance structures.
Lugard did not originate every modern prejudice against the Igbo. His judgement nevertheless gave toxic winds and wings to the damaging habit of interpreting unfamiliar institutions as evidence of an inferior people. One hundred years later, a caricature of his views is still travelling around as a stereotype of the Igbo.
But then, the Igbo also supply their critics with ammunition. Their republican disposition sustained independence of mind while complicating collective action. Where every man’s Obi is his imagined palace, accepting another man’s authority requires negotiation. Being “leaderless” is not an adequate description of the Igbo disposition to individuality. Dispersed leadership is not the same thing as an absence of leadership, just as a lack of agreement on some issues is not necessarily disunity.
In 2007, when many Igbo believed the presidency should pass to their region after Obasanjo, eight candidates of Igbo origin contested on separate party platforms. Igbo’s difficulty arises because their institutions are designed to suit local accountability. They are incapable of producing a common position within a national politics that rewards organised blocs.
Competing ambitions, reinforced by towering egos, defeated the prospect of agreement around one or two standard-bearers. Republican independence may explain resistance to imposed leadership; it cannot excuse persistent failure at strategic cooperation. There is a difference between refusing to be commanded and being unable to agree. The eight candidacies exposed that weakness immeasurably.
Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe and Chief Odumegwu Ojukwu remain towering figures, but neither supplies a transferable leadership formula. Their enduring stature, idealised and romanticised, cannot substitute for the difficult work of building contemporary political agreement.
The Igbo are also intensely self-critical. Their internal arguments can be as unsparing as external attacks. Such self-examination is valuable when it clarifies choices and strengthens accountability. It becomes disabling when criticism turns toxic, disagreement becomes permanent, and no common purpose emerges. Outsiders then appropriate those disputes as evidence that an entire people cannot organise themselves. The challenge is not to silence criticism, but to make it serve collective political action.
The Women’s War (Aba Women’s Riot) of November 1929 challenges that assumption. Beginning at Oloko, it mobilised Igbo, Ibibio and other women against feared colonial taxation and abusive Warrant Chiefs. Women organised through existing networks; they were not a passive population who suddenly discovering politics.
Their resistance forced administrative reconsideration. Their war demonstrated that decentralised institutions could organise formidable collective action when there is clarity of purpose. But Biafra left a deeper and more enduring burden. The Igbo’s attempted secession, followed by civil war, has been reduced to an ethnic temperament. The consequences have become sources of continuing bitter accusations and deeper wounds that won’t heal.
Every Nigerian ethnic group has threatened secession at one time or another; only the Igbo ever matched words with action. But why has promised reintegration remained conditional across generations? Must descendants continually be “outsiders” because an earlier generation fought for separation?
In a nation like Nigeria, the language of national unity requires care. We cannot demand silence from some communities while accepting ethnic bargaining from others. A grievance cannot be treated as illegitimate merely because it is voiced by the Igbo.
The many failures of the Igbo should not explain everything while their achievements explain nothing. The Igbo must work to turn individual “independence” into group cooperation, as they fluently do in business. Nigeria’s task is to criticize conduct without inventing permanent ethnic stereotypes. Lugard’s errors continue to thrive when differences of some are treated as permanent deficiencies, and when a people-group is judged entirely by what others have decided they are.
Dr Richard Ikiebe is a Media and Management Consultant, Teacher and Chairman, Board of Businessday Newspaper





