Tag: ECOWAS

 

*By Paul Ejime

David Aguele, a Nigerian citizen, and the Centre for Community Law (CfCL), an NGO, have jointly sued the President of the ECOWAS Commission and the Council of Ministers at the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice (CCJ), challenging the regional organisation’s decision to retain in its employment staff members from Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, which have withdrawn their ECOWAS membership.

In the suit No ECW/CCJ/APP/47/25 dated 22nd September 2025, Mr David Aguele, an unemployed graduate resident in Benin City, Edo state, and the CfCL are the first and second Applicants/Plaintiffs, while the ECOWAS Council of Ministers and the Commission President are the first and second Respondents, respectively.

The Applicants are praying the CCJ to determine the “legality of Circular ECW/Memo/DC/2025-14/ak issued by the President of Commission, on July 4th 2025,” and/or whether the circular and the decision of the Extraordinary Session of the Council of Ministers held 22-23 April 2025 in Accra, Ghana “are in accordance with Articles 18(5), 10(3)(f) and 92 of the ECOWAS Revised Treaty 1993, and Articles 50(h), 51(1)(b)(viii) and 53(d) of the ECOWAS Staff Regulations (Revised in 2021).

Military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger formed the Alliance of Sahel States, AES, following their countries’ suspension from ECOWAS over the military takeover of governments in the three countries.

On 16th September 2023, the three junta leaders announced that their countries had quit ECOWAS with immediate effect. However, in compliance with the relevant regional instruments, the 66th Session of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government in December 2024 gave the three countries the stipulated 12 months to either formalise their withdrawal by 29th January 2025 or return to the fold.

The Authority further directed the ECOWAS Council of Ministers to convene an Extraordinary Session to determine the separation modalities of the AES countries from ECOWAS.

After the Council session, the President of the Commission issued Circular ECW/Memo/DC/2025-14/ak, suggesting that staff members from AES countries in Grades P5 and above should leave ECOWAS.

In their suit, Mr Aguele and the Centre for Community Law argue that “by reason of this Circular, the 1st Respondent unilaterally decided to retain all AES permanent staff below grades P5 without recourse to the clear provisions of the ECOWAS Revised Treaty and the Staff Regulations or even the clear directives of the Council of Ministers and thus, acted arbitrarily without legal authorisation.”

The declarations/orders sought by the Applicants are:

An order directing the 1st Respondent to pay the sum of ten thousand U.S. dollars (US$10,000) to the 1st Applicant for the pain he suffered and has endured by reason of the decisions

A declaration that from the 29th of January 2025, the citizens of the exited States lost their ECOWAS nationality and the protection afforded under ECOWAS, including the right to work and establish by reason of ECOWAS citizenship passport

A declaration that Circular ECW/Memo/DC/2025-14/ak is unlawful, illegal and therefore null and void.

 A declaration that Circular ECW/Memo/DC/2025-14/ak is a violation of the right of taxpayers, unemployed young persons and a violation of the rule of law, which the 2nd Applicant has a vested interest in upholding within the Community.

A declaration that the context decisions of the Respondents, particularly Circular ECW/Memo/DC/2025-14/ak violate the right of the 1st Applicant in so far as the decisions made it impossible for various vacancies within ECOWAS for which he was legitimately hoping to be employed has been violated, and,

Such further orders that the Community Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances of this suit.

Prof Amos Enabulele Esq. and Michael Agbo Esq. filed the suit on behalf of Mr Aguele and the Benin City-based Centre for Community Law, which “promotes and protects the rights of ECOWAS citizens and the rule of law within the Community.”

The Community Court has not fixed any date to hear the suit, but it gave the Respondents “within 30 days” to enter their defence, otherwise the “…Applicants may proceed therein and judgment may be given in your absence.”

After taking an initial hard line, including the threat of using military force to restore constitutional order in Niger, ECOWAS has lifted the sanctions imposed on the three AES countries, but tried unsuccessfully through dialogue and diplomacy to win them back to the regional bloc.

The ECOWAS annual budget is funded from the Community Levy paid by its member states.

When Mauritania exited ECOWAS in 2000, all its citizens in ECOWAS employment also departed in line with the relevant regional instruments.

According to legal and diplomatic sources, unless the AES issue is resolved administratively, the Aguele/CfCL suit could open the floodgates for other legal challenges to the controversial decision to retain AES staff members in ECOWAS, to be paid from the financial contributions of non-AES Member States.

Meanwhile, the fate of some ECOWAS agencies and institutions in AES countries is also awaiting final determination.

*An award-winning Journalist, Paul Ejime is a Media/Communications Specialist and Global Affairs Analyst*

 

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has concluded plans to launch its 21 member Business Council in September.

Dr. Tony Elumelu, Director of Private Sector said in a statement, that the decision to launch the council was one of the outcomes of the last meeting of the steering committee, the Technical Working Group for the launch.

According to him, the council is expected to help foster economic growth, promote investment, and enhance the attraction of the region and its competitiveness as a preferred investment destination.

Elumelu, who represented the ECOWAS Commissioner for Economic Affairs and Agriculture, Mrs Massandjé Toure-Litse, at the opening of the meeting stressed the necessity of the council to help drive private sector involvement in the region’s integration.

He described the meeting as an important milestone in the journey to realisation of the council, which was established by the region’s Council of Ministers vide Regulation C/REG.9/6/21 as the pivot for mobilising the private sector in ECOWAS integration.

He noted that the objective of the meeting was to review the current status of implementation, assess readiness, and finalise preparations for the business council’s formal inauguration.

He urged the group to carefully review the various documents prepared by the commission and offer constructive criticisms in order to ensure a successful launch.

Elumelu added that the ECOWAS Business Council, once inaugurated would serve as a central platform for private sector engagement, driving policy dialogue, and promoting intra-regional trade and investment across the member states

In his speech, the Chairman of the Technical Working Group, Mr. Gerard Amangou, commended the programme directorate for diligently following the recommendations of August 5, 2025 meeting and stressed the need to confirm the proposed launch date with the management of the ECOWAS Commission.

In his remarks, Dr. Mansur Ahmed, of the Dangote Group underscored the importance of timely action to ensure a successful launch.

He reaffirmed Dangote Group’s commitment in supporting the ECOWAS Commission and the steering committee in their efforts to realise the objectives of the business council.

The one-day meeting provided an opportunity for representatives from the Office of the President, Dangote Group, ECOWAS Permanent Mission to Nigeria, and the Technical Working Group to collectively review the draft documents and assess overall readiness for the business council launch.

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By Paul Ejime

As it struggles with the consequences of its poor handling of the rash of military coups in the West African region, the leadership of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) appears to have run out of ideas and creativity in the search for an effective solution.

By their decision to use military force to restore constitutional order in Niger following the army takeover of government in that country on 26 July 2023, and the sweeping sanctions imposed on coup plotters in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso and Niger, including travel and flight bans, ECOWAS leaders should have known that they were on slippery grounds.

In its 50 years of existence, the regional bloc is better known for acquitting itself credibly in conflict prevention, management, and resolution, especially ending the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone and effectively restoring constitutional order in member States after military coups.

While Article 45 of the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance 2001 permits the Mediation and Security Council to apply measures including sanctions in the event of an unconstitutional change of government, the Authority of Heads of State and Government had always maintained a principled stance in deploying a combination of tools/strategies – diplomacy and tough decisions, where necessary, in tackling conflicts.

Article 45.1 states: “In the event that democracy is abruptly brought to an end by any means or where there is massive violation of Human Rights in a member State, ECOWAS may impose sanctions on the State concerned.”

45.2. explains: “The sanctions which shall be decided by the Authority may take the following forms, in increasing order of severity:
• Refusal to support the candidates presented by the member State concerned for elective posts in international organisations
• Refusal to organise ECOWAS meetings in the Member State concerned
• Suspension of the member State concerned from all ECOWAS decision-making bodies. During the period of the suspension, the member State concerned shall be obliged to pay its dues for the period.

45.3. During the period of suspension, ECOWAS shall continue to monitor, encourage and support the efforts being made by the suspended member State to return to normalcy and constitutional order.

45.4. On the recommendation of the Mediation and Security Council, a decision may be taken at the appropriate time to proceed as stipulated in Article 45 of the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security 1999.

On Restoration of Political Authority, this Article stipulates: “In situations where the authority of government is absent or has been seriously eroded, ECOWAS shall support processes towards the restoration of political authority. Such support may include the preparation, organisation, monitoring and management of the electoral process, with the cooperation of relevant regional and international organisations. The restoration of political authority shall be undertaken at the same time as the development of respect for human rights, enhancement of the rule of law and the judiciary.”

It should be noted that ECOWAS’ military interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, through its Ceasefire Monitoring Group, ECOMOG, in the 1990s, were under different circumstances and at the behest of the beleaguered governments. Also, in 2016/2017, the deployment of Nigerian air assets and the preparation by Senegalese troops to march on the Gambia only followed the uncompromising position of then-President Yahya Jammeh, who rejected ECOWAS’ mediation, claiming victory in the December 2016 election, which he lost. In the end, Jammeh was exiled to Equatorial Guinea without any military confrontations.

Also, under the 1999 and 2001 Protocols, there are provisions for the deployment of good office missions, including military chiefs, Council of the Wise/Elders or appointment of a Chief Mediator. But ECOWAS leaders did not exhaust these non-kinetic alternatives before going for an aborted military option in Niger. Also, the imposition of travel and flight bans effectively foreclosed the possibility of interactions or negotiations with the coup leaders.

Similarly, Nigeria’s cut of electricity supply to Niger did not derive from any ECOWAS instruments.

Article 52 of the 1999 Protocol states that: “In accordance with Chapters VII and VIII of the United Nations Charter, ECOWAS shall inform the United Nations of any military intervention undertaken in pursuit of the objectives of this Mechanism,” but this was not the case on Niger.

The embarrassment from an unprecedented and unpopular decision for kinetic option in Niger, which fell through, has forced ECOWAS leaders into an uncomfortable situation, and their bending over backwards to placate the junta leaders – a strategy fraught with potential uncertainties and unsavoury consequences.

Most critically, the implementation of some decisions taken by the ECOWAS Council of Ministers at its extraordinary meeting in Accra, Ghana 22-23 May 2025, on the contingency arrangements for the departure of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger (known as the Alliance of Sahel States, AES, could damage the integrity, unity and cohesion of the regional bloc irreparably, and hasten its further disintegration.

Article 91 of the ECOWAS Revised Treaty 1993 is unambiguous on the withdrawal of any member state from ECOWAS. Article 91.1 states clearly: “Any member State wishing to withdraw from the Community shall give to the Executive Secretary (President of the Commission) one year’s notice in writing… At the expiration of this period, if such notice is not withdrawn, such a State shall cease to be a member of the Community.

91.2. During the period of one year… such a member State shall continue to comply with the provisions of this Treaty and shall remain bound to discharge its obligations under this Treaty.”

ECOWAS rules do not provide for “group withdrawal,” and following the precedent with Mauritania’s withdrawal in 2000, there was no need for the ECOWAS Council of Ministers to reinvent the wheel, the way it did in Accra.

The junta leaders announced their countries’ withdrawal from ECOWAS “with immediate effect” in January 2024.

However, under the 1993 treaty, that withdrawal only became effective by January 2025, and acting on humanitarian grounds, ECOWAS granted its staff from the AES countries until September 2025 to leave with an additional three months’ pay until December 2025.

Yet, the Council at its Accra meeting decided to:

a. ”adopt a two-phase disengagement process for the affected staff. The first phase will involve staff in Senior Professional positions… and all G-Staff from the three countries that are working at ECOWAS institutions to be relocated and will take effect at the end of September, based on termination letters already sent to the staff concerned. The (ECOWAS), Commission is given until the end of December 2025 to recruit staff to fill the resulting vacant positions.The second phase will involve P4 Staff and below and will be carried out on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the specific circumstances of the staff concerned, including age and the priority needs of the institutions.”

“On regional market and economic integration, the Council underscored that Free Movement and Economic matters are at the core of regional integration and deserve particular attention in discussing separation modalities with the exiting countries.

In a needless move to accommodate the AES countries, “(The) Council noted the existence of various legal frameworks which are the foundation of regional economic integration and directly affect Community citizens… stressed the need to ensure a collective approach to negotiations as a regional bloc based on existing regional instruments such as the Protocol on free movement of persons, the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme and the Common External Tariff.”

Additionally, while it “reiterates the clarity, in the relevant provisions of the ECOWAS staff Regulations, that only nationals of ECOWAS member States are eligible for employment as staff members,” the Council still called for a “Review of the Staff Regulations to reflect current circumstances.”

The Council further authorised the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID), ”to continue with its commitments under ongoing projects in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Still, the Council decided that EBID disengage with staff from the three Countries.”

To many analysts, these concessions are not only too many, but unwarranted and may come back to haunt ECOWAS and its aspirations for regional integration. The junta leaders have been unrepentant in denouncing ECOWAS and all that it stands for while portraying themselves as populist power grabbers determined to perpetuate themselves in the saddle.
ECOWAS should assert itself as a rule-based organisation.

However, its dilemma is that for the past 10 to 12 years, the bloc has ignored or tolerated “constitutional and electoral coups, and human rights violations” by some of its leaders in blatant breach of its own rules. There are also some fifth columnists within, working against ECOWAS.

The Constitutional Convergence Principles under Article 1 of the 2001 Protocol stress among others:

– Separation of powers by the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary.
– Empowerment and strengthening of parliaments and guarantee of parliamentary immunity.
–  Independence of the Judiciary.
– Every accession to power must be made through free, fair and transparent elections.
–  Zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means, and,
– Popular participation in decision-making, strict adherence to democratic principles and decentralisation of power at all levels of governance.

Yet, in their inordinate quest to obtain or retain power at all costs, some ECOWAS leaders have trampled on the regional principles, while the Authority of Heads of State has rendered dormant or ineffectual the ECOWAS Commission and its management, which are supposed to coordinate the programmes and activities of the regional institutions.

As ECOWAS celebrates the 50th anniversary of its formation through the 28th May 1975 Treaty of Lagos, its drastic problems require drastic solutions.

For a start, the ECOWAS Commission should undertake an urgent and transparent recruitment exercise to fill any vacant positions from the teeming army of qualified professionals among the 400 million community citizens and release staff from countries whose leaders despise the regional bloc.

Since the proud junta leaders believe that their landlocked poor countries are self-sufficient, ECOWAS should not reward their arrogance.

To regain its past glory, navigate emerging threats and bequeath an enduring legacy to the next generations, ECOWAS leaders at national and regional levels must change tact and lead by example with vision and dynamism, beginning with effective management of the lingering threats in member States such as Togo, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, The Gambia and Cote d’Ivoire.

*Paul Ejime is a Media/Communications Specialist and Global Affairs Analyst*

 

By Paul Ejime

FLOWERBUDNEWS:      Like ‘a thief in the night’ (not related to the Bible or the popular song), Togolese leader Faure Gnassingbé, on Saturday, 3 May 2025, completed a controversial constitutional reform which opponents and analysts see as the fulfillment of his life ambition for perpetuating himself in power and prolonging the Gnassingbé Eyadema dynasty.

Faure will be 59 on 6 June. He first seized power with the support of Togo’s military in 2005 following the death of his father, President Gnassingbé Eyadéma, who ruled Togo with an iron fist for 38 years.

The younger Gnassingbé has clung to power as President of the Republic through several flawed elections, including those denounced by civil society organisations and boycotted by the opposition.

On 3 May 2025, he took the title of President of the Council of Ministers, the country’s highest executive office, with no term limits.

To avoid any backlash, Faure Gnassingbé’s investiture for his new role was low-key, while the World focused on the burial of late Pope Francis and arrangements for the election of his successor by the college of Cardinals.

It was a seemingly innocuous but momentous shift with far-reaching implications on the Togo polity, from a presidential to a parliamentary system, through the controversial constitutional reform decreed in April 2024.

Under the reform, Gnassingbe’s original role of President of the Republic has become a ceremonial post, replaced by the President of the Council of Ministers, with sweeping executive powers.

To pave the way for his self-perpetuating agenda, Gnassingbe’s ruling Union for the Republic party (UNIR) won 108 of the 113 parliamentary seats in the country’s National Assembly last year.

The UNIR also gained 34 out of 41 Senate seats, after the main opposition parties boycotted the elections, which they dismissed as a sham.

Foreign reporters were not accredited to cover the elections.

The Togo constitutional changes were less than six months before the elections, in violation of the ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance.

But surprisingly, ECOWAS did not publicly challenge the move, instead, the last summit of regional leaders named Faure Gnassingbe’s as one the mediators assigned to work for the return of the three Alliance of Sahel, AES countries that broke away from ECOWAS. The mediation is at best, faltering.

Ironically, Togo’s Foreign Affairs Minister Robert Dussey, on March 11, 2025, announced that his country could join the AES countries. That statement has not been refuted with critics questioning Togo’s fidelity and sincere commitment to the ECOWAS regional integration agenda.

Incidentally, ECOWAS is marking the 50th anniversary of its establishment this year, with activities planned for Ghana, Togo and Nigeria, given the pivotal role played by Nigerian former Head of State General Yakubu Gowon and Togo’s late President Gnassingbé Eyadéma in the birthing of the regional economic bloc.

To confer a semblance of inclusiveness in the Faure Gnassingbé government reform, Jean-Lucien Savi de Tové, 86, a former Minister of Trade (2007-2009) and an opposition figure, was sworn in as Togo’s new President of the Republic, which under the new constitution is largely a ceremonial position, without any executive powers.

Critics and keen watchers of politics in Togo are in no doubt that the controversial constitutional reform was designed by Gnassingbé to extend his grip on power indefinitely, especially when his final presidential term under the old constitution approached its end in 2025.

Human rights, the media and opposition voices are stifled in Togo. Public protests are officially banned or met with government repression.

Professor Aimé Gogué, leader of the opposition Alliance for Democracy and Integral Development (ADDI), accused Faure Gnassingbé of pushing the constitutional changes to enable him to “rule for decades, unchallenged.”

However, now that Gnassingbé has apparently realised his long-term political ambition, what are the guarantees for democratic accountability, institutional legitimacy, or the future of opposition politics in Togo?

How can ECOWAS and the African Union respond?

Critics consider the Gnassingbé government’s actions as “constitutional/institutional and electoral coups.”

Will the “civilian coups” go unchallenged or without consequences, and how would the regional or continental organisations muster the moral authority to stop other countries that might follow the Togo example?

As ECOWAS battles insecurity, four Member States – Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso and Niger – are now ruled by the military.

By August this year, the junta leader in Mali, Assimi Goiata, a former army Colonel who self-promoted himself to a General, would have been five years in power, and recently announced plans to rule for an additional five years unelected.

His colleague in Guinea, Mamady Doumbouya, another army colonel, who seized power in 2021 and elevated himself to General and President, also eyes a five-year transition period.

Doubtless, the same thought of power elongation must be running through the minds of the junta leaders in Niger and Burkina Faso, who have not made public their political programmes.

Meanwhile, ECOWAS and the Sahel regions remain a zone of instability buffeted by terrorism, violent extremism and separatist armed insurrections, with a high rate of unemployment, especially among the teeming young population and avoidable economic hardships.

In the case of ECOWAS, potential political hot spots include Cote d’Ivoire, where President Alassane Ouattara, 83, plans another election this year, for what critics consider his fourth term in office since 2011.

There is also Guinea-Bissau, whose President Umaru Embalo, recently threatened to expel an ECOWAS/UN mission from his country, having suspended the national constitution and dissolved parliament, leaving the judiciary and the Election Commission dysfunctional.

Sierra Leone is still battling the fallout from its disputed 2023 elections, and President Adama Barrow of the Gambia appears laser-focused on re-election in 2026, rather than governance or the ratification of a new constitution to end lingering problems from former President Yahya Jammeh’s 22-year dictatorship, which ended in 2017, with his exile to Equatorial Guinea.

The prognosis might look grim, with the rest of the World seized with various domestic concerns.

However, with proper diagnosis, Africans are those who can/will save Africa from self-inflicted and externally engineered problems. Citizens’ active participation/involvement and demand for accountability from civilian and military rulers will free the restive, otherwise rich but impoverished and badly managed continent from bad governance.

*Happy Golden Jubilee Anniversary, ECOWAS!*

(Paul Ejime is a Media/Communications Specialist and Global Affairs Analyst)