I agree entirely with President Tinubu’s position that he should not be blamed for the recent wave of defections into the APC. Come to think about it.
Did the President compel anyone to join his party? Did he coerce governors or legislators to abandon their platforms? Clearly, no. The President himself declared during an interfaith Iftar with senators at the Presidential Villa in Abuja on 27 February 2026 that “…they accused me of killing the opposition, but didn’t have a gun,” implying that he did not force or hold anyone at gunpoint to defect to his own political party.
Governors and lawmakers are not political minors. They are experienced public office holders, elected into office by the people and fully empowered by law to make political decisions. If they conclude, rightly or wrongly, that aligning with the ruling party serves their interests or those of their states, that is a choice for which they must bear responsibility.
Nigeria may indeed be passing through difficult times, but attributing the phenomenon of cross-carpeting to one individual speaks to a far deeper institutional problem. The real problem lies not in politics, but in law, specifically, in how the Nigerian legal profession has interpreted constitutional provisions on defection.
*Judicial Interpretation, Not Presidential Influence, Enables Indiscriminate Defections*
1. At one point, Hon. Justice Inyang Ekwo delivered what many regarded as a bold and principled decision: that a governor who defects from the political party under whose platform he was elected ought to vacate his office. That reasoning aligned with the spirit of political accountability and party discipline, giving hope that Nigerian democracy might begin to mature ideologically rather than function as a marketplace of convenience. However, that decision did not stand. The Supreme Court set it aside, holding that governors and their deputies do not lose their offices upon defection in the same way legislators might. That interpretation fundamentally altered the landscape of political responsibility.
2. Even with respect to legislators (where the Constitution appears stricter), the expected sanctions have rarely materialised. Why? Because, in the Rivers State line of cases, as an example, the Supreme Court introduced an additional threshold: *that defection is not complete until the lawmaker’s name appears on the membership register of the new party.* This requirement is not expressly found in the Constitution, yet it has become the operational test. The practical effect has been profound. It created a legal grey zone wide enough for political actors to manoeuvre freely, defect strategically, and avoid constitutional consequences.
It’s accordingly seen that political actors behave according to the incentives and restraints established by law. Where the law is firm, discipline emerges. Where it is elastic, opportunism flourishes.
Nigeria’s current culture of defections did not arise in a vacuum. It grew out of judicial doctrines that diluted the constitutional intention of preserving electoral mandates and party accountability. In other words, the legal environment has made defections low-risk and high-reward.
*The Blame Lies Squarely With The Legal Profession*
This brings us to the often-overlooked role of the legal profession in shaping democratic culture. Lawyers do not merely espouse rules; they shape governance outcomes. Courts do not only settle disputes; they define the moral architecture of political conduct. Through advocacy, interpretation, and adjudication, members of the legal profession serve as the guardians of constitutional discipline. Where that guardianship is assertive, politics becomes structured and principled. Where it is hesitant or overly technical, politics becomes transactional. By prioritising narrow legal formalism over constitutional purpose, the members of the legal profession established a legal system that inadvertently signalled to political actors that party loyalty is optional and electoral mandates are transferable commodities.
*Democracy Requires Normative Guidance, Not Just Legal Technicalities*
A developing democracy such as Nigeria’s, requires jurisprudence that strengthens institutions, not merely resolves disputes. Courts are expected to interpret the Constitution in a manner that advances stability, accountability, discipline, and the sanctity of the ballot, not one that unintentionally rewards political fluidity. When legal interpretation weakens consequences, political behaviour adjusts accordingly. Hence, if defections are now widespread, the explanation lies not in presidential influence but in the permissive legal architecture that governs political mobility. Politicians operate within the boundaries the law allows. The law, in turn, is shaped by lawyers and judges. Therefore, the conversation must shift from personalities to institutions.
Blaming one political leader for a structurally enabled phenomenon distracts from the deeper reform Nigeria urgently needs: *a jurisprudence that restores discipline, fidelity to mandates, and respect for the electoral platform through which power is obtained.*
Nigeria’s democratic future will not be secured merely by changing leaders. It will be secured when members of the legal profession consciously embrace their role as architects of political responsibility and constitutional order.
(Respectfully,
Sylvester Udemezue (Udems).
08109024556.
udemsyl@gmail.com
(28 February 2026)
